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I Introduction: universal human rights 
without universal obligations?
Globalization has brought to the fore a peculiar mismatch between the concept of 
human rights and the allocation of human rights obligations that has been taken 
for granted throughout the 20th century. On the one hand, human rights are sup-
posed to be universal. It is often said that human rights are possessed by all hu-
man beings simply in virtue of their humanity. The universality inherent in the 
concept of human rights expresses a cosmopolitan ideal of equal moral concern 
for all human beings. On the other hand, according to the standard interpreta-
tion of human rights obligations, states bear the primary responsibility for pro-
tecting the human rights of their own members.1 This state-centric interpreta-
tion of responsibilities for human rights protections leaves a gap with respect to 
any responsibility that states might have in their treatment of members of other 
states either through direct action (e.g. through their foreign policy) or indirectly 
through their actions as participants in global governance institutions. It sug-
gests that states must protect the human rights of their own people, but are off 
the hook with regard to their treatment of those who are outside their jurisdic-
tion. The current situation of the prisoners at Guantanamo is perhaps an obvious 
example of how a state can exploit the existence of this gap in the state-centric 
interpretation of human rights obligations for its own (often questionable) goals. 
But perhaps a better illustration of the morally unacceptable consequences of 
the state-centric distribution of responsibilities is former President Clinton’s re-
cent apology for pushing for dramatic tariff cuts on U.S. rice imports to Haiti at 
the expense of Haitian farmers during his time in office.2 Testifying to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on March of 2010 Clinton declared that ‘It may have 
been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a 
1 This criterion includes not only the nationals of a state but also any territorially present, jurisdictionally 
bound persons regardless of their citizenship status, whereas it is supposed to exclude everyone outside 
a state’s jurisdiction. As Donnelly puts it, ‘states have international human obligations only to their own 
nationals (and foreign nationals in their territory or otherwise subject to their jurisdiction or control).’ 
(Donnelly 2003, 34)
2 For some general information about this issue see http://www1.american.edu/TED/haitirice.htm
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mistake… I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to 
produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody 
else.’
As is made crystal clear by this example, in defending the economic interests of farm-
ers in Arkansas, President Clinton took himself to be discharging his obligation 
to protect and promote the rights of citizens in his own country. But in light of 
the humanitarian catastrophe following the collapse of rice production in Haiti, 
he came to recognize his direct responsibility in hampering the human right to 
food of Haitian citizens. However, according to the current distribution of human 
rights obligations, it is hard to accommodate Clinton’s claim of responsibility 
which is at the core of his apology. From the perspective of international human 
rights law, there is no specific legal obligation that Clinton failed to discharge. 
Since he is not a representative of Haitian citizens, he is not responsible for pro-
tecting their interests and rights. From a political perspective, his apology is even 
more puzzling, since Clinton certainly discharged his obligation to defend the 
interests and rights of those to whom he is politically accountable, namely, the 
citizens of his own country. Had he failed to do so in international negotiations, 
he would have faced adverse political consequences at home. Moreover, he was 
exercising this obligation within the legal parameters of the principles of free 
trade established by the WTO – principles which call for the elimination of tariffs 
on imports and other similar trade barriers. With his apology, Clinton is clearly 
suggesting that he did something wrong and that he is the one responsible for it, 
but neither of these claims make sense within the standard state-centric ascrip-
tion of responsibilities for human rights protections currently recognized by the 
international community. According to this state-centric interpretation neither 
the US government nor the WTO have a legal obligation to protect the human 
rights of Haitian citizens. Officials from Haiti are the only ones responsible for 
their protection. But wait! If this is the case, then there is actually no gap in the 
distribution of human rights obligations after all. Shouldn’t Haitian officials be 
held accountable by the international community for their failure to discharge 
their obligation to protect their citizens’ human right to food? Didn’t they fail to 
protect and promote the human rights of their own citizens in allowing such a 
humanitarian catastrophe to happen? Actually, it is hard to argue that they did. 
For if they had refused to bring Haiti’s trade policies in line with the WTO agree-
ments and accept the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank then the 
economic consequences would have been even more devastating for Haitian citi-
zens. It does not take a former head of State like Clinton to see what is wrong with 
this picture. Precisely the fact that none of the actors involved failed to discharge 
their respective obligations indicates that, for cases like this one, the current dis-
tribution of human rights obligations impairs the effective protection of human 
rights. For the actors who have the legal obligation to protect the human rights 
of their citizens – individual states – may not have the effective capacity to do so 
and the actors who do have the effective capacity – the WTO, IMF or the World 
Bank – do not have the obligation. 
This points to a serious structural incoherence in current human rights practice. By 
using various UN human rights agencies the international community is sup-
posed to monitor states and to hold them accountable for any failure to protect 
the human rights of their members. However, at the same time, the international 
community may also use other UN agencies like the World Bank or the IMF to im-
pose structural adjustment programs without any obligation to check whether 
these programs undermine the ability of recipient states to protect the most ba-
sic human rights of their members.3 The devastating consequences of this struc-
tural incoherence make it clear that an alternative to the state-centric ascription 
of human rights obligations is urgently needed to move the human rights project 
forward in a globalized world. Can a philosophical conception of human rights be 
of any help here? I think that the answer is yes, but only after the state-centric as-
sumptions that pervade philosophical debates on human rights are questioned. 
II Traditional vs practical approaches to 
human rights in philosophical debates
In current philosophical debates there are two main ways of looking at human rights. 
One is the so-called traditional or orthodox approach that is mostly concerned 
with core philosophical questions regarding the nature, grounds and substan-
tive content of the concept of human rights. Following this approach, different 
3 See Freeman (2002), p.153. For an in depth analysis on the negative impact of the IMF and the World Bank 
structural adjustment programs on human rights see Abouhard and Cingranelli (2007).
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authors articulate different conceptions of what human rights are on the basis 
of some independently grounded account of human nature or human freedom.4 
Despite its philosophical importance a weakness of this approach is that it tends 
to work in disconnect from actual human rights practice. The main task is to 
answer abstract questions related to the nature and grounds of human rights, 
whereas more practically oriented questions such as the proper allocation of hu-
man rights obligations tend to be regarded as subsidiary. The so-called political 
or practical approach starts from the opposite side. It takes contemporary hu-
man rights practice as a guide in order to figure out what human rights actu-
ally are.5 This orientation towards contemporary practice makes the practical 
approach seem more promising in terms of its ability to offer fruitful answers 
to the difficult questions that arise within that practice. However, a weakness of 
this approach is that precisely because it takes current practice as a guide it also 
tends to take the state-centric view of human rights obligations for granted, as 
this view pervades current practice. In so doing, it seems unable to offer fruitful 
guidance to the crucial challenges this practice currently faces. My contention, 
however, is that there is no intrinsic connection between adopting the practical 
approach and accepting a state-centric conception of human rights obligations. 
In what follows I would like to substantiate this claim through a detailed analysis 
of the core assumptions of the practical approach (III). On the basis of this analy-
sis, I will offer an alternative account of the practical approach that is compatible 
with a pluralist conception of human rights obligations (IV). Although I cannot 
provide here a fully articulated account of such a conception, I hope that even 
the brief sketch I will offer suffices to show that the practical approach to human 
rights contains valuable resources that are worth exploring.
4 For some examples see Craston (1973), Gewirth (1982), Donnelly (1982), Sen (2004), Griffin (2008), Talbott 
(2010). 
5 The main representatives of the practical approach are J. Rawls, J. Raz, J. Cohen, T. Pogge and C. Beitz. Beitz 
(2009) offers the most extensive and in depth account of the practical approach available to date. For this 
reason, I focus mostly on this work.
III The practical approach to human rights
As already mentioned, whereas the traditional approach attempts to ground human 
rights on some authoritative account of human nature or human freedom, the 
‘political’ or ‘practical’ approach takes contemporary human rights practice as 
being authoritative for an understanding of what human rights are. The guiding 
thought is that by understanding the aim and purposes of contemporary practice 
one can grasp the concept of human rights that is actually operative in it. Thus, 
its main claim against traditional approaches is that the content of human rights 
cannot be determined solely by moral reasoning divorced of any reference to the 
distinctive functions that human rights play in contemporary practice. The tra-
ditional approach may lead to a successful conceptual analysis of some morally 
significant rights while simultaneously failing to identify the concept of human 
rights that is actually operative in contemporary human rights practice. If so, dis-
crepancies between the philosophical reconstruction of the traditional approach 
and the realities of current practice may lead to prescriptions for revision of the 
latter that seriously undermine its goals by undermining its ability to perform 
the functions that are necessary to reach them. The failure to properly appreciate 
the distinctive functions that international human rights are supposed to play in 
contemporary practice will likely lead to proposals for revisions of that practice 
that may be at best useless and at worst harmful. In contradistinction, discrepan-
cies between current practice and a critical reconstruction that is based on an ac-
curate understanding of its distinctive functions are likely to issue proposals for 
revision that aim to improve the practice’s ability to reach its own goals. In fact, 
one of the main attractions of the practical approach is the promise of fruitful 
guidance in helping the human rights project to achieve its goals. 
In light of this brief characterization of the practical approach, it should be obvious 
that the identification of the overall aim or purpose that guides contemporary 
human rights practice is one of its most essential features. By grasping the aims 
of the practice and understanding its significance we obtain the central inter-
pretative clue that allows us to answer the question of what human rights actu-
ally are through the indirect path of figuring out what distinctive functions they 
play in practice. Given this general methodological strategy characteristic of the 
practical approach, it is hard to overestimate the impact that the initial theoreti-
cal move of identifying the practice’s overall aim has on the answer of what hu-
man rights are, as well as on the subsequent answer of what human rights there 
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are. Since the theoretical strategy consists in determining what human rights 
are through the indirect method of figuring out what they are for within a given 
practice, nothing can have a deeper impact on the answer to that question than 
the specific answer given to the prior question of what the overall practice itself 
is for. As I said before, it is by understanding the point of the practice of human 
rights that we understand what human rights actually are.6 
This can be easily illustrated by Rawls’s Law of Peoples, which is generally identified 
as the first account of human rights that follows the practical rather than the 
traditional approach. According to Rawls, the main goal of human rights practice 
is to determine the limits of toleration between peoples. In light of this goal, the 
distinctive function of human rights is to ‘specify limits to a regime’s internal 
autonomy’, such that the regime’s fulfillment of the rights of its citizens ‘is suffi-
cient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for example, 
by diplomatic and economic sanctions or... by military force.’ (Rawls 1999, 79-80) 
It is not coincidental that an interpretation of the function of human rights as 
(defeasible) triggers for coercive intervention against states7 yields a notoriously 
truncated list of rights that bears little resemblance to the list of rights actually 
contained in the major human rights conventions and treaties, which have been 
signed by a majority of states.8 Rawls’s list of human rights proper is limited to 
the ‘right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to free-
dom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure 
of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property 
(personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural 
6 This also gives us a relatively independent standard to judge the plausibility of different accounts of hu-
man rights. In examining any proposed conception of human rights, if it turns out that the purported 
human rights are such that they could not play the key roles that the current practice of human rights 
requires them to play, we can safely conclude that it is an account of something other than human rights. 
It may be an account of moral or natural rights, but not of international human rights as they are under-
stood in the contemporary legal and institutional practice. 
7 See Tassioulas (2009).
8 The major human rights conventions are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Genocide Convention. 
For a complete collection of these and other human rights documents see Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 
(2010).
justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly).’ (Rawls, p. 65) Rights to 
political participation, to an education or to full equality and non-discrimination 
are conspicuously absent. However, as some have argued, if Rawls is right and the 
distinctive function of human rights is to trigger coercive intervention against 
states, his list may actually be too expansive. In light of the highly problematic 
nature of this kind of international action, hardly anything beyond genocide or 
massive violations of the right to life may safely qualify for inclusion among the 
list of human rights proper.9 I don’t want to assess here the plausibility of Rawls’s 
highly revisionary account of human rights. Instead, I just wish to highlight the 
crucial importance that the initial identification of the goals of contemporary 
human rights practice has for the resulting account of human rights as well as 
for the practical guidance that it can be expected to provide.10
Now, in light of these observations, it seems advisable to keep a crucial distinction 
in mind. The methodological assumption that is constitutive of the practical ap-
proach, that an understanding of the political function of human rights in con-
temporary practice is essential for a proper understanding of what human rights 
are, must not bleed over into specific substantive accounts that different authors 
may provide of what that political function in particular consists in. Although the 
distinction may seem straightforward, it is actually quite remarkable that pro-
ponents and critics alike seem to take it for granted that adopting the practical 
approach is tantamount to accepting that the political function of human rights 
is to specify constraints against state sovereignty.11 There is space for variation 
in how this function is interpreted by different proponents: human rights can 
be seen as triggers for external intervention or as benchmarks of a state’s politi-
cal legitimacy. But regardless of the details, everyone seems to agree that com-
mitment to the practical approach implies commitment to a state-centric con-
9 See Buchanan (2010), p. 47.
10 For a criticism of Rawls’s narrow understanding of the distinctive function of human rights as triggers for 
coercive intervention see Nickel (2006). He offers a list of 14 functions that human rights norms play in 
contemporary practice of which providing standards for coercive intervention is just but one of them (see 
p. 270).
11 Since Rawls’s approach refers to ‘peoples’ rather than ‘states’, his own wording is slightly different. His 
own description of the function of human rights is to ‘specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.’ But 
this terminological difference is insignificant in our context.
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ception of human rights, according to which the main function of human rights 
is to regulate the behavior of states towards their own people. Now, it is true 
that most defenders of the practical approach happen to endorse a state-centric 
conception of human rights.12 Moreover, the state-centric conception finds quite 
12 See Rawls (1999), p. 79-80, Cohen (2004), p. 195, Beitz (2009), p. 13, Raz (2010), p. 328. Raz’s views on the 
issue are unclear. On the one hand, he explicitly affirms the state-centric view when he claims: ‘Follow-
ing Rawls I will take human rights to be rights which set limits to the sovereignty of states’, but what he 
adds to this is interesting. He continues ‘in that their actual or anticipated violation is a defeasible reason 
for taking action against the violator in the international arena.’(ibid.) However, this second feature of 
human rights norms does not require the violator to be a state. Puzzlingly, Raz recognizes this a little bit 
later when he says: ‘I will continue to treat human rights as being rights against states. But I do not mean 
that human rights are rights held only against states, or only in the international arena. Human rights 
can be held against international organizations, and other international agents, and almost always they 
will also be rights against individuals and other domestic institutions. The claim is only that being rights 
whose violation is a reason for action against states in the international arena is distinctive of human 
rights, according to human rights practice.’ (p. 329) This sounds reasonable, however, as a consequence 
it seems to follow that Raz has not given us an appropriate characterization of what human rights are. 
He first makes the very strong claim that he takes human rights ‘to be rights which set limits to the sov-
ereignty of states’ and he then withdraws that claim later without giving us an alternative account of 
what human rights are. As he puts it later, strictly speaking his claim is that ‘observation of human rights 
practice shows that they are taken to be rights which, whatever else they are, set limits to the sovereignty 
of states, and therefore arguments which determine what they are, are ones which, among other things, 
establish such limits.’ His claim is therefore reduced from a very strong definition of human rights (one 
that provides both necessary and sufficient conditions) to a pretty weak identification of one of their 
properties (thus at best a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for something to qualify as a 
human right). However, it is far from evident that immunity from international intervention against state 
sovereignty is actually a necessary condition for something to qualify as a human right (cf. 336). This is the 
strong claim that leads to a pretty truncated list of human rights proper, especially if intervention is un-
derstood in the coercive sense of economic sanctions and military intervention. The situation with Pogge 
is unclear in a different way. Although he does not explicitly endorse it, his conception of human rights 
is often included among those representative of the practical approach. In addition, many interpreters 
ascribe to him a state-centric conception of human rights based on a quote from his book World Poverty 
and Human Rights, where it is claimed that ‘human rights are, then moral claims on the organizations 
of one’s society’ (p. 64). However, interpreting Pogge’s institutional view of human rights as endorsing 
a state-centric conception is clearly incorrect in light of his other claims, such as that ‘human rights are 
moral claims on any coercively imposed institutional order, national or international.’ (Pogge 2000) or, 
even more clearly, that ‘human rights are moral claims on global institutions’ (Pogge 1998). Thus, it seems 
more charitable to take the following definition of human rights from his book as his considered view, 
namely, ‘a human right to X entails the demand that, insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive social 
institutions be so designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X.’ (p. 46; my 
emphasis). 
widespread support outside the confines of the practical approach as well.13 Still, 
it should be clear that there is no internal connection between endorsing the 
methodological claim that is constitutive of the practical approach and accepting 
the substantive claim about the distinctive function of human rights that charac-
terizes the state-centric conception. 
Insisting on this distinction is important for the prospects of defending the practical 
approach against critics who hold, rightly in my view, that the state-centric claim 
is false.14 Whereas defenders of the traditional approach may reject the state-
centric conception of human rights and still hold on to their respective accounts 
of what human rights are (e.g. protections of human agency, autonomy, freedom, 
etc.), defenders of the practical approach who endorse the state-centric concep-
tion are committed to the strong identity claim that human rights are norms to 
regulate state behavior. Thus, if the state-centric claim proves to be untenable, 
so does their account of what human rights are. Nothing else is left to hold on to.
There is a pretty straightforward way to show the untenability of the state-centric 
claim within the framework of assumptions characteristic of the practical ap-
proach. Recall that, according to this approach, it is by understanding the point 
of contemporary human rights practice that we understand the distinctive func-
tion that human rights play in that practice, and, in understanding their distinc-
tive function, we thereby come to understand what human rights actually are. 
Now, according to the state-centric view, human rights are norms that regulate 
the behavior of states towards their own people. From this it follows that if there 
were no states (or if the relevant functions of states were transferred to other 
types of political units such as non-state organizations) there would be no hu-
man rights. As many critics have pointed out, this claim seems utterly implau-
sible.15 Based on past experience, we have plenty of reasons to believe that the 
13 For some examples see Donnelly (2003), 34ff., Martin (2005), 45ff., Nickel (2007), 7, Talbott (2005), 3, Tal-
bott (2010) 10.
14 For some examples see Tasioulas (2009), 945ff and Griffin (2010), 751-52.
15 Tassioulas aptly expresses the objection in the following terms: ‘If states are the sole bearers of the pri-
mary duties to implement human rights, this would have the peculiar upshot that a universal moral right 
ceases to be a human right simply because the primary responsibility for its fulfillment has shifted to 
non-state organizations.’ (Tassioulas 2009, 945)
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protection of human rights would be a meaningful practice under any plausible 
division of political space. 
Now, what is important to notice in our context is that this argument against the 
state-centric view is not an argument against the practical approach per se. For 
what this argument shows is precisely that the state-centric view misidentifies 
the function of human rights in current human rights practice. Since this prac-
tice would still have a point in the absence of a division of political space by states, 
it cannot be the case that the distinctive function of human rights is to regulate 
the behavior of states by setting limits on their sovereignty. If this is so, what the 
practical approach demands is an alternative, more accurate account of the point 
of contemporary human rights practice.
IV An alternative account of the 
practical approach to human rights
Now, rejecting the state-centric conception of human rights does not require deny-
ing that one of the functions of human rights is to regulate the behavior of states 
towards their own people. A rejection of the state-centric conception merely de-
nies that this is their distinctive function if for no other reason than the fact that 
this is the distinctive function of the domestic citizens’ rights that are embedded 
in each state’s legal system. If human rights served the exact same function as 
domestic constitutional rights then they would be redundant.16 Moreover, the 
constitutional rights of many modern states are the result of a long-standing 
16 This claim has no direct bearing on the question of whether international human rights and domestic 
constitutional rights coincide or differ in content. Instead it is simply a claim about their different func-
tions. The practical conception of human rights is committed to the view that in order to understand 
what international human rights are we need to understand their specific function ‘in a normative prac-
tice to be grasped sui generis’ (Beitz 2009, 12). Different conceptions of the function of human rights may 
lead to different views of their proper scope. Rawls, for example, defends the view that human rights are 
a proper subset of the constitutional rights of citizens in liberal democracies (Rawls 1999, 81). But, as we 
saw above, his notoriously narrow conception of the scope of human rights follows from his narrow con-
ception of the proper function of human rights and not from his endorsement of the practical approach 
per se.
practice of regulating the power of government. Citizens engaged in this prac-
tice well before anything like contemporary human rights practice emerged in 
history. Thus, if we are to understand the point of contemporary human rights 
practice, it seems clear that we need to bring some other element into the picture 
beyond states and their citizens. 
As we saw before, according to Rawls the point of human rights practice is to set the 
limits of toleration between peoples. This already indicates that their primary 
function is not domestic but international. Rawls’s claim that ‘human rights play 
a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples’17 indicates that the additional ele-
ment needed to make sense of human rights practice, beyond states and their 
citizens, is an international community whose members commit themselves to 
abide by a reasonable Law of Peoples which includes the protection of human 
rights as one of its core ingredients. However, this implies that the necessary 
condition for the existence of such practice is not simply mutual toleration but 
above all cooperation among its participants. If their joint commitment to as-
sure the protection of human rights is to have any point at all, what needs to be 
identified is not so much the limits of their toleration but instead the triggers of 
their active cooperation such that their shared goal can be achieved. In fact, this 
is often pointed out in the standard accounts of the emergence of contemporary 
human rights practice at the beginning of the 20th Century.
According to the standard view,18 the human rights project emerged at the dawn of 
a Westphalian conception of international relations, the so-called law of separa-
tion, which aimed at the mere co-existence among absolutely sovereign states.19 
Many scholars identify the emergence of an international economy derived from 
the industrial revolution as an important development that paved the way for 
a slow shift in international relations towards a law of cooperation instead of a 
law of separation. The creation of the League of Nations is often identified as the 
first example of this shift in the conception of international relations because of 
its explicitly proclaimed aim ‘to promote international cooperation and peace 
17 Rawls (1999), 79. 
18 Some authors disagree with the claim that contemporary human rights practice originates with the cre-
ation of the UN after WWII and situate their origins more recently, towards the end of the Cold War. For 
an example see Moyn (2010).
19 For an example of this view see Salomon (2007), p. 21ff.
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and security’. In spite of the League’s notorious failure to prevent war and its 
subsequent demise, the awareness of its members that such common interests 
and normative goals could only be achieved through cooperation led to the cre-
ation of the UN and its Charter after World War II. In addition, the horrors of the 
Nazi regime, epitomized in the Holocaust, provided an important motivation 
for adding the protection of human rights to the goals of peace and security in 
the UN Charter. Its signatories committed themselves to ‘take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the organization’ to promote ‘universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (United Na-
tions 1945, article I.3). Thus the UN Charter laid down the principles of universal 
respect for the human rights of all persons and of international cooperation to 
protect and promote human rights. Shortly after the approval of the Charter in 
1945, a UN committee was charged with writing an international bill of rights. 
This emerged in 1948 as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which gave 
specific content to the international community’s commitment to the protection 
of human rights.20 The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) states that ‘the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights... to the end that every individual and every organ of society... 
shall strive... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progres-
sive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance.’ After the Preamble, a list of rights follows that indi-
cates the kind of human interests that human rights norms are meant to protect 
(interests in personal or economic security, freedom of expression, etc.), some of 
the standard threats21 to those interests (torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest, etc.), 
as well as important institutional means for their protection (equal protection 
under the law, due process, free elections, etc). Towards the end of the document, 
the aim of securing human rights protections worldwide mentioned in the Pre-
amble is expressed again in Article 28, which makes it explicit that ‘everyone is 
20 In fact, the rights included in the declaration were taken from already existing national bills of rights. The 
key difference between them is not their respective content, but the fact that human rights are supposed 
to apply to all persons in all countries. For an excellent exposition of the drafting process that culminated 
in the UDHR see Glendon (2002).
21 This expression was originally coined by Shue (1996), but its use has become customary in current ac-
counts of human rights.
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’.
All of this suggests that the complex legal and institutional phenomenon that we 
currently identify as contemporary human rights practice goes back to a joint 
commitment freely undertaken by the members of the international community 
to the global political project of ‘securing the universal and effective recognition 
and observance of human rights.’ This provides a straightforward answer to the 
question of the overall aim or purpose of this practice. Now, if we take the goal 
of securing the protection of human rights worldwide as the overall aim of hu-
man rights practice, we can see why the state-centric claim that the distinctive 
function of human rights norms is to regulate the behavior of states towards 
their own people is something of a near miss. Indeed, since the abuse of power by 
states is a particularly salient source of threats to the human rights of their mem-
bers, limits on state sovereignty are a powerful means to the end of securing the 
protection of human rights worldwide. However, such limits may not be the only 
or the most effective means to that end. In fact, depending on the circumstances 
such limits may prove insufficient or simply useless. The previously mentioned 
counterfactual scenario of a world without states as its basic political units high-
lighted such a possibility. But, as the examples of Guantanamo and Haiti indicate, 
there are already sufficient real world scenarios to illustrate the problem without 
any need to appeal to remote possible worlds. 
The identity claim that human rights are rights that regulate the behavior of states 
towards their own people runs into some difficult counterexamples when one 
turns to current debates concerning so-called extraterritorial human rights obli-
gations. These are cases in which states are accused of violating the human rights 
of persons in other countries as a result of actions or omissions in their interna-
tional cooperation or foreign policy.22 The precise scope of these obligations is 
hotly debated and thus open to a variety of interpretations, but the meaningful-
ness of the question among legal practitioners and scholars suffices to show that 
the identity claim just cannot be right. There are at least two reasons why an ac-
count of human rights norms in which extraterritorial human rights obligations 
are ruled out by definitional fiat seems problematic. On the one hand, since hu-
man rights, as opposed to the domestic rights of citizens, are not territorial but 
22 For a good overview of the legal complexities of this issue see Gibney and Skogly (2010).
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universal, it is hard to see why a territorial understanding of human rights norms 
should be essential to the very concept of human rights. On the other hand, limit-
ing the obligation of states to respect the human rights of those persons within 
their jurisdiction runs counter the principle of universal respect for the human 
rights of all persons to which all signatories of the UN Charter are bound.
An even better way to generate counterexamples to the identity claim is by focus-
ing on current debates regarding non-state actors and their adverse impact on 
human rights protections. These non-state actors include individuals (e.g. non-
state armed guerrilla leaders who engage in ethnic cleansing), multinational 
corporations that collaborate with governments in violating human rights, and 
international financial institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank 
whose regulations can have a tremendously negative impact on the protection 
of human rights, especially those of citizens in poor countries. As with the case 
of extraterritorial human rights obligations, here too we need not agree on the 
details of any specific case where a non-state actor is accused of violating human 
rights in order to see the implausibility of the state-centric identity claim. Since 
the practical approach takes current human rights practice as authoritative for 
an understanding of what human rights are, it is important to point out that 
key elements of current practice, such as human rights campaigns lead by NGOs 
and reactions from global public opinion, do not seem to be at all sensitive to 
the distinction between human rights violations perpetrated by state or by non-
state actors (nor are they sensitive to the distinction between a state’s violations 
of the rights of its own nationals and the same state’s violation of the rights of 
members of other countries). Of course, if the aim of human rights practice is to 
secure the protection of human rights worldwide, why should it matter to par-
ticipants whether potential violators are states or non-state actors?23 In fact, the 
policies and regulations of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank are as much the 
23 In light of this question, the state-centric account of the overall aim of human rights practice seems pret-
ty implausible. According to Beitz, ‘human rights are the constitutive norms of a global practice whose 
aim is to protect individuals against threats to their most important interests arising from the acts and 
omissions of their governments.’ (Beitz 2009, 197; my italics). This account of the aim of human rights 
practice suggests that if the exact same threats originate from the governments of other states or from 
non-state actors then they are not a matter of human rights and thus not a matter of concern to the 
international community. However, no indication is offered of the normative reasons that could possibly 
justify this restriction in the eyes of those participating in current human rights practice.
focus of protests by human rights organizations and the subject of reports to 
the UN Human Rights Council as are the actions of governments towards their 
own people.24 The human rights obligations of these institutions as well as the 
compatibility of their policies and regulations with international human rights 
law are also the focus of extensive analysis and debate among scholars of inter-
national law.25
All these recent developments in human rights doctrine seem hard to account for 
in a reconstruction of the practice that is based on state-centric assumptions. If 
Nickel’s claim were correct and ‘the most basic idea of the human rights move-
ment is... the idea of regulating the behavior of governments through interna-
tional norms’ the inclusion of non-state actors within the focus of attention of 
participants in the human rights movement would make no sense at all. Or, if as 
Beitz claims, human rights ‘consist of a set of norms for the regulation of the be-
havior of states’ the view held by many legal scholars that international financial 
institutions have human rights obligations would not simply be questionable or 
contested, as it currently is, but rather senseless. If one buys into state-centric 
assumptions, then the legal debate about the human rights obligations of inter-
national financial institutions ought to be seen as a puzzling misunderstanding 
of what human rights practice is all about.26 Beitz defends his state-centric inter-
pretation of the practical approach to human rights by claiming that the model 
he proposes should be descriptively accurate of current practice and thus should 
24 Some notorious examples are recent human rights campaigns against the patent rights for pharmaceu-
ticals established by the WTO, as well as long standing criticisms by scholars and NGOs of the structural 
adjustment programs of the IMF or of the involuntary resettlements involved in the big infrastructural 
projects funded by the World Bank.
25 For some recent examples see Alston (2005), Clapham (2006), Cottier, Pauwelyn and Bürgi (2005), Darrow 
(2003), Herstermeyer (2007), Marceau (2002), Salomon (2007), Skogly (2001), Zagel (2005).
26 In fact, the UN itself would seem to misunderstand human rights practice as well. According to the UN 
Human Development Report of 2000, the shift from a state-centric approach to human rights obliga-
tions to a pluralist approach is one of the key shifts needed to advance human rights in the next quarter 
century. Among ‘the 6 shifts from the cold war thinking that dominated the 20th century’ that the re-
port identifies, the first two are most significant in our context: ‘From the state-centered approaches to 
pluralist, multi-actor approaches – with accountability not only for the state but for media, corporations, 
schools, families, communities and individuals’ as well as ‘From the national to international and global 
accountabilities – and from the international obligations of states to the responsibilities of global actors.’ 
(HDR, p. 13; my italics)
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not be changed unless the practice itself changes.27 This may seem like a feasible 
defense of the state-centric model, but in fact it only highlights its problems. Pre-
cisely because such changes are perfectly conceivable,28 the fact that the state-
centric model would not survive them provides additional evidence of its un-
tenability. The continuity of human rights practice throughout those changes is 
precisely what the state-centric model would not be able to account for. Since the 
state-centric conception of human rights practice takes a particular distribution 
of human rights obligations at a given time not as a means for the realization 
of the human rights project but as its very goal, any significant changes in such 
distribution must lead to the conclusion that the resulting practice is a different 
project with a totally different purpose. 
Now, since individuating human rights norms by identifying states as their primary 
addresses seems problematic in light of the emergence of powerful non-state 
actors in the international arena, let’s take a look at the other distinctive func-
tion that human rights norms play according to the state-centric model. Given 
that defenders of this model maintain that the point of human rights practice 
is setting limits on state sovereignty, this commits them to the claim that hu-
man rights are essentially triggers for justifiable intervention against a state’s 
sovereignty by external agents. There is perhaps a difference in emphasis among 
these authors as regards the types of interventions they envisage. Whereas Raw-
ls’s analysis, as we saw, seems to emphasize coercive interventions such as eco-
nomic sanctions or even military intervention,29 Raz and Beitz identify a wider 
27 Beitz (2009), 124.
28 In fact, many legal scholars claim that these changes have already happened. Salomon (2007) offers an 
example. Referring to the legal context, she claims that ‘there is widespread consensus that the tradi-
tional view of human rights, which focuses solely on the individual obligations of states, is now outdated.’ 
(p. 6) It should be clear that the plausibility of my argument does not depend on the truth of this empirical 
claim. But I mention it just to point at what seems to me a significant disconnect between the state-
centric conception of human rights obligations that is predominant in philosophical debates on human 
rights and the current discussion on human rights among legal scholars of international law where the 
issue of the human rights obligations of non-state actors is one of the main foci of current debates.
29 It is not clear to me that coercive interventions play a more distinctive role than non-coercive ones in 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples, since Rawls also contemplates non-coercive interventions, such as providing 
assistance to burdened societies, which seem intrinsically related to the function of human rights in a 
reasonable Law of Peoples. Be that as it may, in the present argumentative context nothing turns on 
determining this issue.
variety of actions (some of which are non coercive) as appropriate methods of 
intervention. Raz expresses the underlying idea as follows: ‘I will take human 
rights to be rights which set limits to state sovereignty, in that their actual and 
anticipated violation is a (defeasible) reason for taking action against the viola-
tor in the international arena.’ (Raz 2010, 328)
Here again, if we take the goal of securing human rights worldwide as the point of 
human rights practice rather than the goal of setting limits on state sovereignty, 
we can then see why the state-centric claim that the distinctive function of hu-
man rights norms is to trigger external intervention is also something of a near 
miss. For, indeed, coercive and non coercive interventions by members of the 
international community that seek to regulate the behavior of states towards 
their own people are a powerful means to the end of securing the protection of 
human rights worldwide. But such interventions may not be the only methods 
available. Again, depending on the circumstances, such interventions may be in-
sufficient or simply useless. If what is hampering the protection of the human 
rights of a group of people in some country, let’s assume, is some policy imposed 
by the IMF, some project funded by the World Bank, or some trade regulation of 
the WTO, then it seems that the only appropriate action to be taken by members 
of the international community would be to change those policies or regulations. 
The usual interventions that seek to regulate the behavior of states won’t solve 
the problem at all. 
Now, it should be clear that by characterizing the state-centric focus on intervention 
as a near miss I agree that it captures something important about the distinctive 
function of human rights. In my view, the practical approach does indeed require 
adherents to endorse the view that human rights are essentially triggers for in-
ternational action.30 However, nothing in the practical approach justifies limit-
ing the appropriate international action in question to interventions against a 
state’s sovereignty in particular. Let me briefly explain why. 
As mentioned before, the complex legal and institutional phenomenon that we iden-
tify as contemporary human rights practice goes back to a joint commitment by 
the members of the international community to secure the protection of human 
30 In my opinion, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for something to qualify as a human right. 
So, this claim by no means rules out that human rights fulfill many other functions. For a list of some of 
these functions see note 10 above.
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rights worldwide. This commitment is what lends practical significance to the 
claim that human rights are a matter of concern for the international commu-
nity. Thus if members of the international community were to officially deny that 
potential or actual violations of human rights provide a (defeasible) reason for 
taking action in the international arena, this act would have the performative 
significance of withdrawing the original commitment on which international hu-
man rights practice rests. As a consequence, the practice as we know it would 
collapse.31 The Westphalian view of international relations as a law of separation 
among absolutely sovereign states would be reinstated as the official doctrine of 
international law. 
However, nothing in this argument justifies the additional claim that appropriate 
international action must take the form of interventions against a state’s sover-
eignty. From the perspective of the practical approach, what the most appropri-
ate type of action turns out to be in each specific case cannot be determined in 
advance. The right answer seems contingent on what happens to be the most ad-
equate and efficient means to reach the practice’s own goals. Whereas a critical 
reconstruction of the norms that underlie contemporary human rights practice 
justifies the identity claim that human rights are rights whose actual or antici-
pated violation is a defeasible reason for action against the violator by members 
of the international community, nothing about the norms constitutive of this 
practice justifies the restriction of possible ‘violators’ to states and of the appro-
priate ‘actions’ to interventions against a state’s sovereignty.32 Taking this con-
tingent feature of current practice as one of its constitutive norms seems to be a 
clear case of giving undue authority to the status quo. However unintended, this 
argumentative move serves the ideological purpose of closing off – by conceptu-
31 This claim should not be misunderstood as involving any optimistic assessment regarding the seriousness 
with which members of the international community take their commitment to protect human rights. 
From the point of view of identifying one of the enabling conditions of contemporary human rights prac-
tice, it is enough that they continue to offer at least lip service to that commitment. This is the minimally 
needed basis for the legitimacy (as well as the potential ‘power’) of the actions of other participants in 
human rights practice such as NGOs, UN human rights agencies, etc.
32 At the beginning of his book, Beitz mentions that ‘it is not clear why a practice that aims to protect in-
dividual persons against various threats should assign responsibilities primarily to states rather than to 
other kinds of agents.’ (p. 2) I could not agree more. However, given his acceptance of the state-centric 
conception of human rights, this claim suggests that he may provide some justificatory answer to this 
question later in the book. But if so, I must confess that I have not been able to find it.
al fiat – substantive normative questions that ought to be open to serious debate 
within the practice, namely, the nature and extent of human rights obligations 
held by non-state actors, the appropriate actions of members of the interna-
tional community in light of new global threats to human rights, etc. In light of 
the international community’s commitment to secure human rights worldwide, 
the only normatively plausible interpretation of the above mentioned function 
of human rights norms is an understanding of ‘violators’ as whoever happens 
to be actual violators in each specific case and an understanding of ‘actions’ as 
whichever available actions would be most effective for avoiding or remedying 
the violations at issue. It is hard to see how any other interpretation of human 
rights norms could avoid the objection that ‘the practice’s norms are ill-suited to 
advance its aims’, to use Beitz’s own expression.
This critical reconstruction of contemporary human rights practice has revisionary 
consequences. However, they are quite different from those of other proposals 
that follow the practical approach. As was noted before, in the case of Rawls’s ac-
count of human rights, his interpretation of the function of human rights norms 
as triggers for coercive intervention against a state’s sovereignty lead to a revi-
sion of the list of human rights proper that bears little resemblance to the rights 
included in the Conventions and treaties that have been already signed by most 
countries. However, one may wonder whether my alternative proposal does not 
suffer from the opposite defect. By broadening the meaning of ‘intervention’ 
beyond the well-defined limits of the state-centric conception, this interpreta-
tion may fail to offer any guidance at all in determining the set of human rights 
proper. As I will try to show in what follows, I think that this fear is unfounded. 
IV. 1 The dynamic character of human rights norms
Even in its broad interpretation, accepting the identity claim that human rights are 
essentially triggers for international action has substantive implications, for it 
imposes significant constraints on what can plausibly be claimed to be a human 
right. As Raz puts it, ‘international law is at fault when it recognizes as a human 
right something which, morally speaking, is not a right or not one whose vio-
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lation might justify any kind of international action’33 against the violator. Two 
important constraints follow from accepting the view that human rights are es-
sentially a matter of concern for the international community. Human rights are 
not simply rights worthy of protection. They are those rights (1) whose protection 
can be meaningfully achieved by institutional means, and (2) whose actual or an-
ticipated violation provides a (defeasible) reason for some type of action against 
the violator by the international community. 
These constraints help avoiding the danger of over-inclusiveness that is likely to re-
sult from traditional approaches to human rights that do not include this kind of 
considerations (e.g. those approaches that define human rights simply as moral 
rights that all human beings have in virtue of their humanity). Adding these con-
straints explains why the core human rights documents do not contain rights 
such as the right to be told the truth or not to be betrayed in personal relations. 
It is true that adding these constraints does not provide a criterion that singles 
out once and for all the definitive list of human rights proper. But in my opinion, 
this is not a weakness but rather a strength of this interpretation of the practical 
approach. For it highlights a crucial feature of human rights practice that any 
plausible conception of human rights has to be able to account for, namely, their 
essentially dynamic character.34 
This important feature of human rights norms can be illustrated by paying attention 
to their internal complexity. Following the description we used before to char-
acterize the list of human rights contained in the UDHR, we can say that human 
rights are norms to protect all human beings against standard threats to some of 
their most important interests by the most reliable institutional means available 
33 Raz (2010), 329. I quote here only the first part of Raz’s statement, with which I agree. However, his com-
plete statement adds a qualification that restricts international action to actions against states. It reads: 
‘International law is at fault when it recognizes as a human right something which, morally speaking, is 
not a right or not one whose violation might justify international action against a state, as well as when 
it fails to recognize the legitimacy of sovereignty-limiting measures when the violation of rights morally 
justifies them.’ (Raz 2010, 329)
34 On the dynamic character of the content of human rights see Beitz (2009), 31, 44; also Buchanan (2010), 
57, 75. My exposition follows Buchanan’s account of the consequences of taking the dynamic character of 
human rights seriously, although it is not clear to me whether he would situate himself among those who 
defend a practical approach of the kind I am defending here.
at any given time.35 On the basis of this schematic definition, we can distill three 
core elements of human rights norms:
1 The fundamental interests that have the moral significance of grounding hu-
man rights (i.e. of grounding protection claims),
2 The standard threats against those interests (i.e. the range of social, economic 
or political dangers and abuses that are likely to occur in a given social con-
text), and
3 The appropriate (institutional) means for their protection (i.e., the range of 
national and international actions that can reliably prevent or remedy their 
violation)
It is true that in order to identify the human interests to which human rights norms 
refer a plausible justification is needed as to why those human interests in par-
ticular have the moral significance of grounding human rights, and this step in-
deed requires ordinary moral reasoning. However, in light of the empirical nature 
of the other two elements of human rights norms it is also clear that their content 
cannot be solely specified by determining the first element, namely, these per-
manent features that are shared by all human beings in virtue of their human-
ity. The (2) relevant standard threats as well as (3) the appropriate institutional 
means of protection against them are essential elements of the very content of 
human rights norms.36 In fact, many of the rights specified in the existing human 
rights documents do not necessarily refer to the underlying interests shared by 
all human beings. As we mentioned before, some of the rights refer to the stan-
dard threats against those interests that can be expected in modern societies (e.g. 
35 In my view, the human interests that have the moral significance of grounding human rights are those 
whose satisfaction is needed for leading a dignified human life. I cannot address this issue in depth here, 
but I will just mention that all of the main human rights documents make reference to the notion of 
human dignity, whereas none of them mentions some of the alternative notions that are often referred 
to in philosophical accounts of human rights such as ‘minimal’ or ‘urgent’ interests or those whose sat-
isfaction is needed for a minimally ‘decent’ life, etc. In fact, I agree with Beitz that the normative stan-
dards identified in the existing human rights documents far from minimal are actually quite demanding. 
Moreover, I think that the notion of ‘human dignity’ contains an element of equal status and therefore its 
satisfaction is a comparative issue and not a matter of meeting some fixed threshold of minimal ‘decent’ 
conditions.
36 See Buchanan (2010), 86.
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the right against arbitrary arrest or torture) or to specific institutional means 
for their protection (e.g. the right to equal protection under the law or to free 
elections). However, since these two elements of human rights norms change 
over time and under varying social circumstances, the precise content of human 
rights norms is in need of ongoing legal and institutional specification and can-
not be determined once and for all by ordinary moral reasoning alone in the way 
that philosophical accounts of natural rights have traditionally proceeded.37
Seen from this perspective, the main difference between the practical and the tra-
ditional approach is not that the former can dispense with the philosophical task 
of providing a plausible account of the first element (i.e., an account of which hu-
man interests have the moral significance of grounding human rights and why).38 
In fact, this task is not only a legitimate philosophical enterprise, but one that has 
practical significance, since it seems necessary for proper adjudication in cases 
of potential conflict among rights.39 In my view the crucial difference between 
37 In light of their internal complexity and dynamic character, human rights norms are best interpreted as 
‘unsaturated’ placeholders, to use Habermas’s expression. They are abstract norms essentially in need 
of ongoing legal and institutional specification according to the changes in social and historical circum-
stances. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas defends this interpretation of the various bills of rights 
contained in national constitutions (see Habermas 1999, 123-31). On the basis of what he calls a procedural 
paradigm of law, he claims that national constitutions are best understood as ongoing historical projects 
in need of specification and revision in light of changing social and historical circumstances. The same 
seems obviously true of human rights norms. As much as national constitutions are best understood as 
historical projects, human rights practice is an ongoing global political project. As social, institutional 
and historical conditions change, so do the relevant standard threats to human interests as well as the 
available institutional means to their protection and thus the specification of the content of human rights 
must change accordingly. Thus any account of human rights that does not pay attention to these essen-
tially empirical and changeable components won’t provide an account of human rights as the elements 
of contemporary human rights practice, but of some other kind of moral or natural rights.
38 However, even if the need to accomplish this philosophical task is recognized, focusing on the distinc-
tive roles that human rights norms play in contemporary human rights practice gives two significant 
advantages to the practical approach: (1) it can go a long way in clarifying very important aspects of that 
practice without having first to determine which of the possible ways of grounding human rights norms 
on different conceptions of human nature or human freedom is correct and (2) it can leave open the pos-
sibility that a plurality of such conceptions may be able to support the same human rights norms from 
within a variety of cultural context and traditions. 
39 Since most human rights documents appeal to the concept of human dignity as the key consideration 
in order to determine among all possible human interests those that ground human rights, this makes 
reflection about what human dignity requires unavoidable in order to resolve conflicts among rights. For 
both approaches is that the practical approach acknowledges the essentially 
dynamic nature of human rights norms, and thus rejects as wrongheaded the 
static assumption behind the traditional project of trying to derive a definitive 
list of human rights from some fundamental value or principle that stands upon 
the basis of moral reasoning alone. For even if one assumes that the fundamen-
tal interests of human beings which have the moral significance of grounding 
human rights are universal and do not change, the other two components are 
contingent, change historically, and need to be adapted to new circumstances. 
The standard threats to important human interests as well as the most effective 
institutional arrangements available for their protection vary with the different 
social, political, economic and cultural circumstances in which human beings 
find themselves. However, all three elements are equally relevant for the task of 
determining the full content of human rights.40 
From the practical perspective it is easy to understand why the standard threats as 
well as the most appropriate institutional arrangements for protection against 
them are essential components of human rights norms. For they address the 
crucial question of the counterpart obligations to those rights. By indicating the 
kinds of actions or omissions relevant to human rights protections they help an-
swer the question of which actors have which obligations with regard to which 
rights. And this is a question that cannot be settled just by providing plausible 
justifications of the moral significance of the interests to be protected. What is 
required, in addition, is plausible justifications of why some specific agents rath-
er than others have the obligation to contribute to their protection, why some 
agents rather than others should bear the costs of their implementation, why 
it is not unreasonably burdensome for them to do so, etc. As Beitz convincingly 
argues, by focusing on the philosophical task of determining the fundamental 
interests that ground human rights (on the basis of some fundamental princi-
ple or value) traditional approaches tend to be too recipient-oriented and their 
account of human rights neglects the question of the proper allocation of the 
obligations that correspond to those rights. Indeed, the allocation of obligations 
is treated as a subsidiary issue that has no direct bearing on the content of hu-
an interesting analysis of this crucial function of the notion of human dignity for legal adjudication see 
McCrudden (2008). 
40 See Buchanan (2010), 5.
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tion of human rights obligations as an intrinsic feature of human rights practice. 
Adhering to any particular allocation of human rights obligations without taking 
stock of the changes in standard threats to fundamental human interests or of 
the changes in the available institutional means that can reliably contribute to 
their protection would predictably undermine the ability of the practice to reach 
its goals. Thus, if participants in the practice take these goals seriously, if they 
accept that human rights are rights whose actual or anticipated violation is a 
defeasible reason for action against the violator by members of the international 
community, then there is no possible justification for the a priori restriction of 
possible ‘violators’ to states and that of the appropriate ‘actions’ to interventions 
against a state’s sovereignty. The only norm suited to reach the practice’s goals is 
one that interprets ‘violators’ as whoever happens to be the actual violators in a 
given case and that interprets appropriate ‘actions’ as those actions that would 
actually be effective for avoiding or remedying the violations at issue. 
Still, I do not mean to deny that accepting such an unrestricted or pluralistic norm 
would require a revision of the current view of human rights obligations by the 
international community.42 But, if my general argument is plausible, there are 
many ways to revise the state-centric allocation of human rights obligations 
that would nevertheless be recognizable continuations of current human rights 
practice to the extent that they are perfectly compatible with its core normative 
principles and its justifying goals. In fact, as I will briefly indicate in what follows, 
some recent developments of human rights practice already point in that direc-
tion. 
42 I disagree with two elements of Beitz’s own description of the current allocation of human rights obliga-
tions. According to Beitz’s ‘two-level model of human rights’, states have the primary responsibility to re-
spect and protect the human rights of their own citizens (cf. p. 108). This claim seems incorrect. According 
to the UN Charter and all human rights documents, the responsibility to respect the human rights of all 
persons is universal and thus binds everyone. But I do agree that states have the primary responsibility to 
protect and promote the human rights of their citizens. However, regarding the secondary responsibilities 
of the international community, Beitz’s description seems to me weaker than what it is currently recog-
nized. According to him, the actual or anticipated violation of human rights provides merely pro tanto rea-
sons for outside agents to act, but this falls short of an strict obligation to protect from violations by third 
parties of the kind that states have vis-a-vis their own citizens. As Beitz puts it, ‘a human rights failure in 
one society will not require action by outside agents.’ (p. 117) This is surely true for many violations of hu-
man rights. However, by signing the document of the 2005 World Summit, all members of the UN General 
Assembly have explicitly recognized their responsibility to protect all persons from violations committed 
by third parties in an analogous manner to the responsibility to protect that states have with regard to 
man rights. However, it seems obvious that a practice that seeks to achieve the 
protection of human rights through institutional means and international ac-
tion must involve considerations regarding (1) the proper allocation of human 
rights obligations from among those agents in a position to act and (2) the proper 
identification of the most effective institutional protections from among those 
available at any given time. A practice that can only achieve its goals by identi-
fying appropriate agents and actions cannot view allocation issues as simply a 
subsidiary question. Whether a right is amenable to protection by institutional 
means, whether its protection could provide some intelligible reason for action 
by members of the international community, and whether some permissible 
form of international action could effectively protect it are essential consider-
ations to determine whether or not a putative right is a human right proper. On 
this point I totally agree with Beitz. However, in my opinion he fails to appreciate 
all the implications of acknowledging the dynamic character of human rights. 
If the proper allocation of human rights obligations essentially depends on the kind 
of actions and agents required for human rights protections and this in turn nec-
essarily depends on the nature of the standard threats to be expected as well as 
on the most effective institutional arrangements for protection against those 
threats that are available in a given social context at a given historical time, then 
the historical and social dimension of contingency inherent in these two factors 
implies that no specific allocation of human rights obligations can be taken as defi-
nitional of what human rights are. If the intrinsically dynamic character of inter-
national human rights endorsed by the practical approach is correct, it follows 
that the appropriate answer to the question of which agents have which obliga-
tions cannot be determined in advance, since it is contingent on the nature of 
currently existing threats, the feasible institutional means to confront them, the 
agents who are in a position to implement those means, etc. Changes in social 
circumstances cause new threats to emerge and new institutions to be created 
and this can give rise to new rights that were not previously conceived.41 These 
changes may in turn necessitate a new determination of which agent or agents 
and which institutional safeguards are best suited to provide the relevant pro-
tections. This suggests that, contrary to what is generally assumed, adopting the 
practical approach is actually incompatible with taking the state-centric distribu-
41 See McCrudden (2008), 721ff; Habermas (2010), 467-8; Buchanan (2010), 57.
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IV. 2 A pluralist conception of human rights obligations: 
the principle of universal respect for the human rights 
of all persons
When thinking about potential ‘violators’ from the perspective of the alternative ac-
count defended here, the unrestricted interpretation of the meaning of human 
rights norms requires members of the international community to explicitly ex-
tend the circle of actors whose behavior is subject to international human rights 
norms beyond states to any non-state actors with the capacity to hamper the 
protection of human rights.43 To some extent, this has already occurred in the 
domain of international criminal law, but it could be extended to other domains. 
This extension could be carried out in different ways, some of which are perfectly 
compatible with ascribing primary responsibility to states for the protection of 
the human rights of their own members. If, following what has become standard 
terminology, we distinguish between the duties to respect, protect and fulfill hu-
man rights,44 it is clear that the obligation to ‘protect’ human rights can have 
very different meanings. These different meanings depend on whether obliga-
tions are interpreted in the narrower sense of (merely) respecting human rights 
or in the more expansive sense of (actively) fulfilling human rights. Whereas in 
their own citizens – even though the scope is so far limited to just four specific cases of international crim-
inal law (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity). Although Beitz does not 
mention this development, I think that it provides direct support to his repeated claim that participants 
in human rights practice have, since its inception, contemplated some role for international action aimed 
at protecting human rights. In my view, this is not just a contingent, empirical claim that may turn out to 
be false. It is a conceptual claim. Since contemporary human rights practice originates in a commitment 
by members of the international community to secure the protection of human rights worldwide, this is 
the point of the practice and not just one of its contingent features. From this perspective, the explicit 
recognition of the responsibility to protect expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document is 
just a further specification of the exact meaning and implications of the original commitment to protect 
human rights that enables and sustains human rights practice as we know it. 
43 To use Pogge’s terminology, what makes any actor’s behavior subject to international human rights 
norms is specifically their capacity to undermine the secure access to the object of human rights. See 
Pogge (2002).
44 This particular terminology was introduced by Eide (1987). The conceptualization of the multiple obliga-
tions structure applicable to all human rights expressed in this tripartite division was originally proposed 
with a different wording by Shue (1980).
the second, more expansive sense it is indeed very plausible to claim that states 
bear the primary responsibility in providing the protections, entitlements and 
services necessary for fulfilling (i.e., promoting and enforcing) the human rights 
of their members, it does not seem at all plausible to claim that states are the 
only actors that bear primary responsibility for respecting the human rights of 
their members. The obligation of respecting the human rights of all persons in 
the sense of not contributing to their violation is a universal obligation and thus 
one that binds states just as much as non-state actors. 
As far as global governance institutions such as the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank 
are concerned, the relevant difference between promoting and respecting hu-
man rights is the difference between taking the fulfillment and enforcement of 
human rights as their own goal (i.e., becoming a human rights organization) and 
accepting the obligation to ensure that the regulations they implement in the pur-
suit of their respective goals (e.g., trade liberalization, financial stability, economic 
growth, etc.) do not hamper the protection of human rights worldwide. In light of 
this distinction, it seems clear that the question of whether or not these institu-
tions ought to make the goal of actively promoting and enforcing human rights 
part of their legal mandate or whether this function ought to be left to states 
and human rights institutions, has no bearing on the quite different question 
of whether they are bound by international human rights law to respect human 
rights by making sure that the regulations they implement (in pursuit of their 
own specific goals) do not have an adverse impact on the protection of human 
rights. Whereas the former question is complex and its appropriate answer is 
therefore highly contested, the positive answer to the latter question seems 
hardly questionable from a normative point of view.45 As many legal scholars ar-
gue, global governance institutions such as the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank 
could acknowledge their obligation to respect human rights by creating institu-
tional mechanisms to ensure that the policies and regulations they enforce do 
not impair the enjoyment of human rights. They could discharge their obligation 
to exercise human rights due diligence, for example, by engaging in human rights 
impact assessments of their proposed policies and regulations before enforcing 
45 For a comprehensive overview of the vast legal literature on this issue see Skogly (2001) and Darrow 
(2003).
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them.46 Acknowledging the legal obligation to respect human rights in this strict 
sense falls well short of an obligation to actively protect and promote human 
rights of the kind that states and human rights agencies have and it is perfectly 
compatible with maintaining the latter.47
From a normative point of view, applying the due diligence standard to global gov-
ernance institutions is clearly the minimum requirement compatible with main-
taining a credible commitment from the international community to ensuring 
the protection of human rights worldwide. In fact, many legal scholars argue 
that global institutions already have this legal obligation under international law, 
since their members are legally bound by the UN Charter to respect the human 
rights of all persons.48 From a viewpoint of somber realism, there is no denying 
the fact that if members of the international community were to take legal steps 
in that direction it would indeed be an extraordinary achievement. However, the 
46 The standard of due diligence has been recently recognized by the UN Human Rights Council as appropri-
ate to discharge the responsibility to respect human rights by transnational corporations. In June 2008, 
the Council explicitly confirmed the responsibility of transnational corporations to respect human rights 
and requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on this issue, John Ruggie, to ‘elabo-
rate further the scope and content’ of that responsibility (see paragraph 4(b) of Resolution 8/7, available 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf). In his Report to the 
Council in April of 2009 this responsibility is interpreted as requiring ‘an ongoing process of human rights 
due diligence, whereby companies become aware of, prevent, and mitigate adverse human rights im-
pacts.’ (available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/A.HRC.8.5.pdf) 
This process should include four elements: adopting a human rights policy, undertaking – and acting 
upon – a human rights impact assessment, integrating the human rights policy throughout the company, 
across all functions, and tracking human rights performance by monitoring and auditing processes to 
ensure continuous improvement. These four ways of operationalizing the standard of due diligence in the 
activities of MNCs seem easily applicable to international financial institutions. For an in depth analysis 
of the possibilities and difficulties in institutionalizing human rights impact assessments of trade agree-
ments in the WTO see Walker (2009) and Zagel (2007). For an analogous analysis regarding the IMF and 
the World Bank see Darrow (2003).
47 I offer an overview of various institutional proposals for legally entrenching the obligation to respect hu-
man rights in international financial institutions that are currently under discussion among legal scholars 
in Lafont (2010).
48 For an interesting example of this line of legal argument that focuses on the human right to food see 
Narula (2006). Although the author recognizes that globalization requires challenging the state-centric 
ascription of human rights obligations, her argumentative strategy consists in deriving the human rights 
obligations of global governance institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank from the obligations of 
their member states. 
utopian character of this revision pales in comparison to the revisions that the 
unrestricted interpretation of human rights norms defended here would involve 
regarding the range of appropriate actions that could be expected or required 
from members of the international community. Here is where the revisionary 
potential of this reconstruction of human rights practice really shows its norma-
tive teeth. 
IV. 3 A structural approach to human rights protections: 
the principle of international cooperation to protect 
human rights
By freely undertaking a commitment to ensure the protection of human rights 
worldwide, members of the international community have imposed on them-
selves an obligation that goes beyond the universal ‘duty to respect’ that actors 
can fully discharge simply by exercising human rights due diligence, that is, by 
making sure that their actions do not contribute to the violation of human rights. 
They have undertaken a ‘responsibility to protect’ against human rights viola-
tions perpetrated by third parties, notably (but not exclusively) states. In fact, 
the UN General Assembly explicitly recognized this responsibility in the outcome 
document of the 2005 World Summit.49 This document only concerns the inter-
national community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ against four types of violations 
of international criminal law (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity) and it therefore only makes reference to the types of peaceful 
and coercive actions that the international community may justifiably take with 
regard to these specific types of violations. Nevertheless, this is an important first 
step in the ongoing process of legally specifying the precise content and scope of 
the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ human rights. This pro-
cess is far from accomplished and is therefore still open to a diversity of possible 
49 On 15 September 2005, UN General Assembly Member States embraced the ‘Responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. See paragraph 
139 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement.
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interpretations among the different participants of contemporary human rights 
practice. However, as previously argued, the practice’s own aims rule out the pos-
sibility that the future legal specification of this responsibility could amount to 
anything less than an acknowledgment that the actual or anticipated violation 
of human rights is a defeasible reason for some type of preventive or remedial 
action by members of the international community. For denying this would be 
tantamount to withdrawing the commitment to secure the protection of human 
rights worldwide on which human rights practice is based. Thus it seems that 
the logical extension of the ‘responsibility to protect’ to other domains of inter-
national human rights law would require a specification of (1) the kinds of human 
rights violations or deprivations that are (defeasible) triggers for action by the 
international community and (2) the kinds of actions that can reliably prevent or 
remedy those types of violations. 
Although this process is still in its early stages, some legal scholars cite the UN Gen-
eral Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development from 1986 as evidence 
that human rights practice is evolving in that direction. Among the many salient 
features of this human rights declaration, the most interesting feature for pres-
ent purposes is that it involves adopting a structural approach to human rights 
protections.50 The need to adopt this approach is strongly suggested by the af-
firmation (in Article 6.2) of the indivisibility and interdependence of all human 
rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights) – something that has 
become the UN’s official doctrine ever since. According to the relatively weak in-
terpretation provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
this doctrine states that ‘the improvement of one right facilitates advancement 
of the others. Likewise, the deprivation of one right adversely affects the others.’ 
To the extent that this is so, states must adopt a structural approach to human 
rights protections in order to successfully discharge their human rights obliga-
tions. In addition, the Declaration establishes a direct link between the right to 
development and the existence of an international economic order in which all 
human rights can be fully realized. 
On this basis, the structural approach to human rights protections is not limited to 
the specification of actions that states must take in order to discharge their pri-
mary responsibility to protect the human rights of their own people. The struc-
50 See Salomon (2007), 50-64.
tural approach is also taken in order to specify the kinds of actions that members 
of the international community must undertake in order to discharge their own 
responsibility towards human rights protections which, in this Declaration, is 
designated as a ‘duty to co-operate’ in order to ensure development and elimi-
nate obstacles to development.51 As is stated at the beginning of the Declaration, 
‘efforts at the international level to promote and protect human rights should 
be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic order.’ Al-
though the Declaration clearly falls short of specifying more precisely the kinds 
of actions that would be required to do so, it does indicate that the ‘duty to co-
operate’ includes direct assistance from developed towards developing countries 
in Article 4.2, which states that ‘sustained action is required to promote more 
rapid development of developing countries. As a complement to the efforts of 
developing countries, effective international co-operation is essential in provid-
ing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their compre-
hensive development.’52 From this perspective, the UN Millennium Development 
Goals53 can be seen as an attempt by the international community to specify the 
content of the ‘duty to co-operate’ recognized in the Declaration to the Right to 
Development by indicating specific steps, actions and measures that must be 
taken in order to discharge the self-imposed obligation to secure the protection 
of human rights worldwide.54
At first sight, this may seem to amount to nothing more than a ‘duty of assistance’ 
from rich to poor states and thus as perfectly compatible with a state-centric 
conception of human rights. However, a careful reading of the content that the 
51 For a very interesting collection of analyses on how to integrate the human rights and development agen-
das see Alston and Robinson (2005).
52 Article 7 even suggests a specific reallocation of resources as one of the appropriate ways to reach that 
end, namely to use ‘the resources released by effective disarmament measures... for comprehensive de-
velopment, in particular that of the developing countries.’ 
53 See UN Millennium Declaration. General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 2000. www.un.org/millennium/
declaration/ares552e.htm. For a critical analysis of the diluted scope of some of these goals compared to 
prior more ambitious commitments of the international community see Pogge (2010), 57-74.
54 As some legal scholars argue, the duties specified in the Declaration to the Right to Development give 
specific content to the already existing legal obligation ‘to act jointly and separately for the realization of 
human rights’ and ‘(for) economic and social progress and development’ as stipulated in the UN Charter 
at Articles 55 and 56. On this point see Marks (2010), 172ff.
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Declaration gives to the ‘duty to co-operate’ shows that this is not the case. For, 
in addition to providing assistance to developing countries, members of the in-
ternational community are required to establish a new international economic 
order ‘based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-
operation among all states’ (Article 3.3). 
Needless to say, the seriousness of members of the international community in 
discharging any of the self-imposed obligations expressed in this Declaration is 
questionable, to put it mildly. But, unfortunately, this is true of the seriousness of 
members with regard to discharging the human rights obligations identified in 
any of the Declarations. The question that matters in our context, though, is not 
how realistic it is to expect that members of the international community will 
discharge any of their obligations, but rather what the most plausible reconstruc-
tion of the norms underlying contemporary human rights practice is. From this 
normative perspective, it seems to me that a state-centric conception of human 
rights has a hard time accounting for these recent developments of human rights 
practice. In fact, none of the accounts offered by defenders of the practical ap-
proach so far addresses them at all. But it is also hard to see how they could do so. 
If, according to the state-centric conception, the point of human rights practice is 
to regulate the behavior of states towards their own people and to impose limits 
to internal sovereignty when states fail to comply with human rights norms then 
it is hard to see how the Declaration of the Right to Development can be seen by 
its participants as a meaningful way to continue that very same practice. From 
the standpoint of a practice that distinctively aims at regulating the behavior of 
states towards their own nationals what possible rationale endogenous to that 
practice could ever explain an evolution in the direction of adding norms that 
impose a ‘duty to cooperate’ on the international community to establish a new 
international economic order in which all states can participate as equals?
Moreover, it seems that neither the identified threats to the human right to devel-
opment nor the institutional arrangements required for its protection fit the 
mold of the state-centric framework. For according to the Declaration, the major 
threat to the human right to development is not the behavior of any individual 
state towards its own people but rather the global economic order. Consequently, 
the protection of the right to development requires some institutional arrange-
ments that (1) cannot be implemented by individual states but instead only 
through cooperation among all members of the international community, (2) do 
not concern the behavior of states towards their members but rather towards 
all persons, and (3) require a kind of international action that is not adequately 
characterized as external intervention against the sovereignty of any state, but 
rather as cooperation among states to allow all of them to participate as equals 
in the global economic order. 
Of course, defenders of the state-centric view may deny that the right to develop-
ment is a human right. In fact, the worry of rights inflation is widely shared 
among human rights scholars, so perhaps there are good normative reasons to 
exclude this right from the list. However, this ought to be a debate internal to 
human rights practice based on substantive normative considerations about the 
merits of the case, like all other cases of controversial human rights. It should not 
be excluded simply because it is an anomaly within the state-centric conception 
of human rights. This seems especially important just in case it turns out that the 
current global economic order is indeed a major threat to the project of securing 
human rights worldwide and, therefore, that the state-centric allocation of hu-
man rights obligations is a major obstacle to the project of securing the protec-
tion of human rights in an increasingly globalized world.
 
LECTURE II
Challenging the state-centric 
conception of human rights 
without endorsing the ideal 
of a world state
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I began the previous lecture by focusing attention on the mismatch that globaliza-
tion has brought to the fore between, on the one hand, the universality of human 
rights which gives expression to a cosmopolitan ideal of equal moral concern for 
all human beings and, on the other, the institutional reality of a political space di-
vided into states that seems incompatible with the ideal of equal concern. To the 
extent that states hold the primary responsibility for defending the interests and 
rights of their citizens, it seems that each state must give priority to their own 
citizens over citizens of other countries. Representatives of democratic states are 
also politically accountable to their own citizens for such a prioritization. 
Now, this would not be a problem per se if states were also simply minding their 
own business. But it does generate obvious problems once representatives of 
states participate in global governance institutions such as the WTO, the IMF or 
the World Bank. For in that context they are accountable to their own citizens for 
giving priority to their interests and rights while also making decisions about 
global regulations to which the citizens of other countries are equally subjected 
but to whom they are in no way accountable. This generates a very special kind 
of accountability deficit. The problem here is not simply that whenever citizens 
have no effective means of control over their representatives the latter can easily 
avoid accountability.55 The specific problem here is that they are not even sup-
posed to be accountable to all those who are subject to their decisions in the 
first place. Powerful countries can impose global economic regulations that may 
have devastating consequences for many of those subjected to them and this oc-
curs not so much because the delegates of these countries in global governance 
institutions avoid accountability but rather precisely because they make their 
decisions in the name of such accountability. Since delegates are supposed to 
be accountable to the citizens of their own countries regardless of whether the 
decision-making is at the domestic or transnational level, they often see them-
selves as under an obligation to protect and promote the interests and rights of 
their own citizens and not those of all decision-takers. Thus, strengthening the 
55 I leave aside the obvious additional problems that arise from the fact that the proximate principals of 
delegates in global financial institutions are governments and that their political agenda and perception 
of the national interest often differs from those of their citizens. This is especially (although not only) the 
case with governments of countries that have no democratic structures of accountability.
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accountability of state delegates to their own citizens can only exacerbate the 
problem rather than solve it.56 
In the first lecture I defended a pluralist conception of human rights obligations as 
a first step towards addressing this accountability gap within global governance 
institutions. According to this conception, the circle of actors whose behavior is 
regulated by international human rights norms extends beyond states to any 
non-state actors who have the capacity to hamper the protection of human 
rights. Implementing this extension would require global governance institu-
tions to legally recognize their obligation to respect human rights by creating in-
stitutional mechanisms to ensure that the policies and regulations they enforce 
do not hamper the protection of human rights. Whereas in the previous lecture 
I focused on the various legal mechanisms that would be needed in order to en-
trench human rights obligations in those institutions, here I would like to address 
the political implications of a pluralist conception of human rights obligations. 
It seems clear that the above mentioned accountability gap can be effectively ad-
dressed by imposing the obligation to respect the rights of all persons (rather 
than simply the rights of one’s own citizens) upon representatives in global gover-
nance institutions. What is less clear is whether making representatives account-
able to all those subject to their decisions is also compatible with maintaining 
the current division of political space into states. If state representatives partici-
pating in global governance institutions are not supposed to give priority to the 
interests and rights of their own citizens but are instead supposed to equally re-
spect the rights of all persons, then in what sense are they still representatives of 
a specific state and its citizens? Doesn’t the cosmopolitan ideal of equal concern 
for all persons inevitably lead to a cosmopolitan ideal of a world state in which 
political officials would represent all world citizens and therefore be accountable 
to them all? If so, a pluralistic conception of human rights obligations cannot be 
meaningfully implemented before the current state system has been dismantled 
and institutions with global political authority are created in its place. 
In what follows, I would like to show that this is not necessarily the case. Entrenching 
human rights obligations in current global governance institutions such as the 
WTO, the IMF or the World Bank in no way undermines the ability of its partici-
pants, as representatives of states, to discharge the special obligations they have 
56 For a similar argument see Buchanan and Keohane (2010), 113.
towards their own citizens. To the extent that this is so, those who defend a stat-
ist conception of justice and reject cosmopolitan ideals of global democracy have 
no reason to reject the pluralist view of human rights obligations. I hasten to add 
that my main motivation in showing that a pluralist conception of human rights 
obligations does not require embracing the ideal of a world state is in no way 
related to my own convictions regarding either the desirability or the feasibility of 
that ideal. In fact, my argument won’t make any use of my own views regarding 
the ideal of a world state. My motivation is exclusively based on my convictions 
about the urgency of moving the human rights project forward amidst the in-
creasingly globalized world in which we find ourselves at this particular histori-
cal juncture. Given this urgency, it is important to show that extending human 
rights obligations to all actors in the global arena who have the capacity to impair 
the protection of human rights is indeed compatible with the current state sys-
tem because this then means that such a transformation can be implemented 
here and now, in our current situation. Moreover, it is also important to show 
that such a transformation does not require commitment to a specific ideal for a 
new international order and therefore does not preclude the pursuit of other le-
gitimate political projects, including those that aim at dismantling current forms 
of global political decision-making in order to strengthen the self-determination 
of states. Having legally entrenched human rights obligations in current global 
governance institutions in no way precludes dismantling them in the future. It 
only precludes institutions from enforcing regulations and policies in disregard 
of their impact on the protection of human rights as long as these institutions 
exist. Thus, one can acknowledge that as long as these institutions exist they 
should exercise human rights due diligence and also simultaneously defend the 
need to dismantle them either in order to strengthen the democratic sovereignty 
of states or to replace them with the genuinely democratic political institutions 
of a world state. 
Since the pluralist conception of human rights obligations I defend is compatible 
with a variety of political projects, this compatibility also indicates the concep-
tion’s modest aspirations. Precisely because this proposal tries to be sufficiently 
realistic so that it can be implemented in the here and now, it also lacks sufficient 
utopian import such that it could, on its own, realize the cosmopolitan ideal of 
equal concern for all human beings that underlies the human rights project. As 
a first step, this proposal merely identifies the threshold below which global gov-
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ernance institutions lack any legitimacy.57 But such identification is no substi-
tute for determining additional political conditions that these institutions would 
need to satisfy in order to achieve democratic legitimacy or to reach decisions on 
regulations and policies that meet more demanding normative standards of jus-
tice, equality, etc.58 An appropriate answer to these questions is likely to require 
taking sides on some political ideal for a future international order and perhaps 
the ideal of a global democracy is actually the best ideal. But even those who are 
convinced that this ideal is desirable nevertheless concede that it is not some-
thing that can realistically be expected to happen any time soon. Thus, in light 
of the urgent need to improve human rights protections worldwide, even those 
who endorse the ideal of a world state should be able to acknowledge the im-
portance of defending proposals for improvement that are susceptible of imple-
mentation in our current situation alongside their own long-term ideals. Global 
governance institutions are currently organized by state membership. Therefore, 
in order to argue that a pluralist conception of human rights obligations can be 
implemented under current conditions, it is crucial to show that the state system 
itself does not need to be dismantled in order to render these institutions ac-
countable to all those subject to their decisions. Indeed, as I will try to show in 
what follows, the pluralist conception of human rights obligations that I defend 
is perfectly compatible with allowing members of these institutions, as repre-
sentatives of states, to remain accountable to the citizens of their own countries 
for the special responsibilities they have towards them (I). 
Although this may seem like a disappointingly modest proposal to some, the claim 
that it is politically feasible may seem laughable to others. For this reason, in the 
last section of this lecture I will briefly assess the prospects for current human 
rights practice to evolve in such a way that human rights obligations become 
legally entrenched in global governance institutions such as the WTO, the World 
57 Buchanan and Keohane (2010) identify ‘respect for the least controversial human rights’ as one of three 
substantive criteria of legitimacy for global governance institutions. They call this criterion ‘minimal 
moral acceptability’ and situate it on a par with the criteria of ‘comparative benefit’ and ‘institutional 
integrity’ (see pp. 117ff). However, they do not offer an analysis of specific institutional mechanisms by 
which human rights obligations could be legally entrenched in those institutions in order to meet the 
‘minimal moral acceptability’ criterion of legitimacy.
58 For an overview of proposals of reform of global governance institutions to meet more demanding stan-
dards of democratic legitimacy see Patomäki and Teivainen (2004), 41-108.
Bank and the IMF. Using the ‘spiral model’ developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
to explain the globalization of human rights norms among states I will identify 
some recent developments in the attitudes and actions of these institutions 
which give us a basis for guarded optimism with respect to the prospects of mov-
ing the human rights project forward in a globalized world (II).
I Pluralist human rights obligations in 
a world of states59
As already indicated, a pluralist conception of human rights obligations may seem to 
face the obvious objection that entrenching human rights obligations within cur-
rent global governance institutions requires dismantling the current state-based 
system and creating a new system of institutions with global political authority 
in its place. To the extent that the cosmopolitan moral ideal of equal concern for 
all human beings translates into the political requirement of achieving inclusive 
accountability at the global level, implementation only appears to be possible 
within the political institutions of a world state that, as a single agent, would be 
accountable to all world citizens as a single principal. The purported connection 
between the cosmopolitan moral ideal and such a political consequence is open 
to the usual modus ponens / modus tollens argumentative alternative: whereas 
some authors offer the connection as a reason why a world state is needed for 
transnational democracy60, others use this purported connection against cosmo-
politan claims to global justice which ignore the normative significance of states 
in our current geopolitical situation. Nagel’s article ‘The Problem of Global Jus-
tice’ offers a clear example of the latter strategy. He sharply characterizes the 
structural difficulty at issue here as follows: 
‘I believe that the newer forms of international governance share with the old 
a markedly indirect relation to individual citizens and this is morally signifi-
59 In this section I draw from Lafont (2010).
60 For an example of this line of argument see Schmalz-Bruns 2007.
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cant. All these networks bring together representatives not of individuals, but 
of state functions and institutions. Those institutions are responsible to their 
own citizens and may have a significant role to play in the support of social 
justice for those citizens. But a global or regional network does not have a simi-
lar responsibility of social justice for the combined citizenry of all the states in-
volved, a responsibility that if it existed would have to be exercised collectively 
by the representatives of the member states.’61
Nagel’s counterfactual claim highlights the normative dilemma: either states and 
their representatives have the primary responsibility of protecting the interests 
and rights of their own citizens or a world state would be needed whose rep-
resentatives would have the collective responsibility of protecting the interests 
and rights of all world citizens equally. On such a formulation of the issue it is 
simply not possible to continue to ascribe primary responsibilities to states while 
simultaneously expecting inclusive accountability of global institutions whose 
members represent states rather than world citizens. The problem here is not the 
usual discrepancy between normative expectations and the realities of power 
politics, but a direct conflict between normative expectations themselves. The 
objection is not empirical, but conceptual.
Thus, in order to address this objection we need to examine the precise content and 
scope involved in ascribing primary responsibility to states for the protection 
of their citizens’ interests and rights. This ascription is at the core of the domi-
nant conception of human rights obligations, according to which states bear the 
primary responsibility for protecting the human rights of their own people. In 
spite of the widespread acceptance of the state-centric conception of human 
rights obligations its normative credentials are nevertheless worth examining, 
61 Nagel (2005), 139-40. Nagel’s argument in this passage tackles two questions at once. One is the question 
of ‘inclusion’, that is, the question of whether global institutions have responsibilities towards all citizens 
throughout the world even though their members only have primary responsibilities towards the citizens 
of the countries they represent. The other is the question of the ‘content’ of those responsibilities, that is, 
the question of whether or not the responsibilities of global institutions towards citizens throughout the 
world are as strong as the responsibilities of social justice that national institutions have towards their 
own citizens. The focus of this paper is on the first question only, but in the last section I briefly indicate 
how the proposal I defend bears on some of Nagel’s claims regarding the second question.
for the fragmentation of principals that makes inclusive accountability without 
a world state appear incoherent is a direct consequence of the ascription of re-
sponsibilities characteristic of the state-centric conception. The line of argument 
that I develop in what follows actually accepts two of the claims that lead to the 
normative dilemma pointed out by Nagel. I agree that some assumptions of the 
state-centric conception of human rights are incompatible with the ascription of 
inclusive accountability to institutions of global governance, and I also agree that 
the formation of a world state is the only way to make inclusive accountability 
at the global level compatible with the state-centric conception of human rights 
obligations. But these two claims do not amount to a genuine dilemma, since 
there is a third (more attractive) alternative open. Instead of having to bite the 
bullet of a world state or to renounce the demand of inclusive accountability at 
the global level, it seems best to reject the problematic assumptions of the state-
centric conception of human rights.
I. 1 Challenging the state-centric conception of human rights 
In his book The Idea of Human Rights, Charles Beitz offers a paradigmatic statement 
of the state-centric conception of human rights that he defends. As he explains, 
‘the central idea of international human rights is that states are responsible for 
satisfying certain conditions in their treatment of their own people and that 
failures or prospective failures to do so may justify some form of remedial or 
preventive action by the world community or those acting as its agents.’62 Conse-
quently, human rights practice consists ‘of a set of norms for the regulation of the 
conduct of governments and a range of actions open to various agents for which 
a government’s failure to abide by these norms supplies reasons.’63 Thus, accord-
ing to the state-centric conception of human rights, states bear the primary re-
sponsibility for protecting and promoting the rights and interests of their own 
citizens. The international community bears some responsibility in the protec-
tion of human rights, but, in contradistinction to states, this responsibility is sec-
62 Beitz 2009, p. 13. 
63 Beitz 2009, p. 44.
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ondary (or residual),64 and this is in two senses. First, the international commu-
nity’s responsibility is secondary in the sense that it is activated only if and when 
states are unwilling or unable to protect the rights of their own people. Second, 
the responsibility of the international community is secondary in the sense that 
it is not supposed to replace the protective function of states. The international 
community may provide (temporary) assistance to states through the different 
institutions that act as its agents, but none of these institutions are supposed to 
provide the kinds of protections, entitlements and services that states provide to 
their own members. Whereas states are directly subject to human rights obliga-
tions, the protective function of the international community consists in hold-
ing states accountable for the treatment of their own members. This function is 
exercised by a variety of international and transnational agents and through a 
variety of measures. These measures include monitoring states’ compliance with 
international standards of human rights, offering economic and other incentives 
for compliance (e.g. aid conditionality or preferential treatment in economic rela-
tions), using coercive measures such as threats of economic or diplomatic sanc-
tions and, in cases of gross human rights violations, military intervention.
Although the state-centric conception of human rights obligations is widely accept-
ed, it has some problematic consequences. One striking feature of this concep-
tion is its remarkable silence regarding the obligations of non-state actors (from 
individuals65 to multinational corporations66 or international financial institu-
tions like the WTO, IMF or the World Bank). If states bear the primary respon-
sibility of respecting and protecting the human rights of their own people and 
the secondary responsibility of the international community consists in holding 
states accountable for the treatment of their own people, it seems that non-state 
64 See Goodin 2003, p. 76f.
65 One example of the disconnect between the state-centric conception of human rights and current hu-
man rights practice is that it is possible to prosecute leaders of non-state armed rebel groups for human 
rights violations such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, irrespective of any recognition that they were act-
ing as official agents of a state. On this issue see Clapham (2006), 271-316.
66 Another example of current human rights practice that cannot be easily accounted for within the limits 
of the state-centric conception is the possibility of prosecuting multinational corporations in US Courts 
for violations of international human rights law under the Alien Tort Claims Act. For a good overview of 
the existing international regimes that cover the human rights obligations of corporations see Clapham 
(2006), 195-270. See also Alston (2005).
actors do not have any responsibility to respect human rights and, consequently, 
that the international community has no responsibility to hold such actors ac-
countable for the impact their own actions or decisions have on the protection 
of human rights. However, under current conditions of globalization, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that decisions about global economic regulations taken by 
non-state actors such as the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank can have a tremen-
dous impact on the protection of human rights worldwide. Now, if this is the case, 
isn’t it implausible to claim that these institutions do not have any human rights 
obligations? Even worse, how can the international community hold states ac-
countable for the consequences of global regulations that are not in their hands 
to determine? Shouldn’t the international community hold those actors account-
able whose decisions and actions hamper the protection of human rights, wheth-
er or not they happen to be states, instead of holding states accountable for the 
consequences of decisions or actions that are beyond their effective control? 
The important question here, of course, is whether there is a politically plausible al-
ternative to the status quo. Under the current division of political space by states, 
is it plausible to claim that non-state actors such as the WTO have an obligation to 
protect human rights? Wouldn’t this require the WTO to cease to be a voluntary 
association designed to facilitate trade among its member states and to become 
a human rights organization instead? Now, in order to show how an alternative 
to the state-centric conception’s monistic ascription of human rights obligations 
does not also need to lead to such implausible consequences, it is important to 
pay attention to the ambiguity within the notion of ‘protecting’ human rights 
that I mentioned in the previous lecture.67 If, following what has become stan-
dard terminology, we distinguish between the duties to respect, protect and fulfill 
human rights, it is clear that speaking of the obligation to ‘protect’ human rights 
can have very different meanings. These different meanings depend on whether 
obligations are interpreted in the narrower sense of (merely) respecting human 
rights or in the more expansive sense of (actively) fulfilling human rights. Where-
as in the second, more expansive sense it is indeed very plausible to claim that 
states bear the primary responsibility in providing the protections, entitlements 
and services necessary for fulfilling (i.e., promoting and enforcing) the human 
rights of their citizens, it does not seem plausible at all to claim that states are 
67 See pp. 36-37 above.
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the only actors that bear primary responsibility in respecting the human rights 
of their citizens. The obligation of respecting human rights in the sense of not 
contributing to their violation seems to be a universal obligation and thus one 
that binds states just as much as non-state actors. 
In this context, it is important to resist assimilating the distinction between these 
two senses of ‘protecting’ human rights to the distinction between ‘acts’ and 
‘omissions’, according to which the ‘fulfillment’ of human rights requires posi-
tive action whereas ‘respect’ requires only self-restraint. There may be contexts 
in which this distinction is useful, but our present context is not one of them. 
Inaction may be an appropriate way to discharge the obligation of respecting 
human rights in some contexts by some non-state actors, but surely not by all of 
them. A multinational corporation may decide to cease involvement in a country 
with a high record of human rights violations in order to discharge its obligation 
of respecting human rights. However, this is not a live option for international fi-
nancial institutions that are in charge of regulating different sectors of the global 
economic order (such as the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank). So long as their 
mission is to implement global economic regulations and policies, they have no 
option but to actively choose among alternatives and implement some regula-
tion or other. As far as these institutions are concerned, the relevant difference 
between promoting and respecting human rights is not the difference between 
action and omission. It is the difference between taking the fulfillment and en-
forcement of human rights worldwide as their own goal (i.e., becoming a human 
rights organization) and accepting the obligation to ensure that the regulations 
they implement in the pursuit of their respective goals (e.g., trade liberalization, 
financial stability, economic growth, etc.) do not hamper the protection of human 
rights worldwide. In light of this distinction, it seems clear that the question of 
whether or not these institutions ought to make the goal of actively promoting 
and enforcing human rights part of their legal mandate or whether this func-
tion ought to be left to states and human rights institutions, has no bearing on 
the quite different question of whether they are bound by international human 
rights law to respect human rights by making sure that the regulations they im-
plement (in pursuit of their own specific goals) do not have a negative impact on 
the protection of human rights worldwide. Whereas the former question is com-
plex and its appropriate answer is therefore highly contested, the positive an-
swer to the latter question seems hardly questionable from a normative point of 
view.68 As I argued in the previous lecture, global governance institutions such as 
the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank could recognize their obligation to respect hu-
man rights by legally entrenching a positive duty of due diligence that they could 
discharge, for example, by engaging in human rights impact assessments of their 
proposed policies and regulations before enforcing them. Acknowledging the le-
gal obligation to respect human rights in this strict sense falls well short of the 
obligation that states have to actively protect and promote the rights of their own 
people. To the extent that this is so, it is not obvious why legal entrenchment of 
the standard of due diligence in global governance institutions should be incom-
patible with maintaining the special obligations that states currently have with 
respect to their own people.
I. 2 Achieving inclusive accountability through 
a pluralist conception of human rights obligations
This brings us back to the initial question of whether it is conceptually sound to ex-
pect members of global institutions who are representatives of states to be ac-
countable to all those subject to their decisions while at the same time remaining 
accountable to the citizens of their own countries for their special responsibili-
ties towards them. It seems to me that, once the question is framed in terms of 
the human rights obligations of global institutions, the conceptual dilemma 
loses much of its plausibility. It seems perfectly coherent to claim that members 
of global institutions have, as representatives of states, the special responsibility 
of advancing the interests and rights of their own citizens as strongly as pos-
sible, so long as they respect the limits imposed by the general obligation they 
have as agents of global institutions to make sure that their collective decisions 
do not negatively impact the possibility of protecting human rights. An analogy 
with national level politics makes this view of plural obligations appear all the 
more normatively plausible. In a country with a federal political structure repre-
sentatives of different regions may have a special responsibility to promote the 
interests and rights of citizens from the regions they represent as strongly as pos-
68 For a comprehensive overview of the vast legal literature on this issue see Skogly (2001).
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sible. However, as participants in national institutions, they must also respect 
the limits imposed by their obligation to make sure that their collective decisions 
do not negatively impact the possibility of protecting the constitutional rights 
of all citizens. 
I do not mean to suggest that the analogy between national and global levels is per-
fect nor that the institutional solutions established at the national level (such as 
a supreme court with the final authority to interpret the constitution) would be 
appropriate or desirable at the global level. One important difference between 
national and international levels is that all citizens have the same constitutional 
rights at the national level, whereas at the international level the constitutional 
rights of citizens in some nation-states can be much more extensive and de-
manding than the human rights recognized as applicable to all world citizens. For 
this reason, the proposal I am defending here is compatible with Nagel’s claim 
that the obligations of social justice among the citizens of a particular nation-
state are qualitatively different from and greater than the obligations these com-
patriots have towards citizens of other countries.69 However, in ascribing human 
rights obligations to global institutions, my proposal is directly incompatible 
with Nagel’s additional claim that the actions and decisions of global institutions 
do not 
‘raise to the level of collective action needed to trigger demands for justice, 
even in diluted form. The relation remains essentially one of bargaining, until 
a leap has been made to the creation of collectively authorized sovereign author-
ity. On the “discontinuous” political conception I am defending, international 
treaties or conventions, such as those that set up the rules of trade... are “pure” 
contracts, and nothing guarantees the justice of their results.’ (Nagel 2005, 141; 
my italics)70
Nagel’s view of the regulations of international institutions such as the WTO as ‘pure 
contracts’ (and thus as exempt from any constraints of justice, however minimal) 
69 In pointing out the compatibility of my proposal with Nagel’s statist view of social justice my intention is 
not to endorse this view but rather to show that, even if one endorses it, it provides no convincing reasons 
for rejecting the ascription of human rights obligations to global institutions.
70 For a convincing criticism of this claim see Cohen and Sabel (2006), 171.
seems motivated by a false dilemma. As we saw at the beginning, Nagel’s argu-
ment seems to assume that we have only two conceptual choices: either repre-
sentatives of states have the responsibility of advancing the interests and rights 
of their own citizens or, once ‘a leap has been made to the creation of collectively 
authorized sovereign authority’, they have the collective responsibility of equally 
advancing the interests and rights of the combined citizenry of all states involved. 
The assumption that these are the only possible conceptual choices is quite wide-
spread, not just among statists like Nagel, but even among authors who aim 
to defend the claim that members of global institutions and regional networks 
ought to be subject to both global and domestic accountability. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter offers an example in ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards 
the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks’. On the one hand, she 
claims, very plausibly in my view, that the members of government networks 
‘first, must be accountable to their domestic constituents for their transgovern-
mental activities to the same extent that they are accountable for their domestic 
activities. Second, as participants in structures of global governance, they must 
have a basic operating code that takes account of the rights and interests of all 
peoples.’ (p.39; my emphasis) However, her account of the latter responsibility 
seems too strong to avoid the criticism that it leaves no space for a meaning-
ful exercise of the former responsibility. She explains: ‘Even if participants in 
government networks around the world were satisfactorily accountable to their 
domestic constituents, what duty do they owe to other nations? It may seem an 
odd question, but if these networks were in fact primary structures of global 
governance... then they would have to be subject to global as well as national 
norms. They would be responsible for collectively formulating and implementing 
policies in the global public interest.’ (p. 51; my emphasis) Unfortunately, Slaughter 
does not explain how these two responsibilities can be simultaneously exercised 
in the absence of a world state. To the extent that her proposal is based on the 
same conceptual choices as Nagel’s, it opens itself to the criticism that inclusive 
accountability is conceptually incompatible with domestic accountability. For 
exercising the collective responsibility of equally advancing the interests of all 
world citizens would leave no space for exercising the responsibility of advanc-
ing the specific interests of domestic constituents. In the absence of a world state, 
representatives trying to meet the demands of inclusive accountability would 
be subject to the reproach that they are systematically neglecting the legitimate 
expectations of their own constituents.
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However, once the question of the proper accountability of global institutions is 
framed in terms of the obligation of respecting human rights, a way out of Na-
gel’s dilemma opens up. For we can see how the global and domestic responsibili-
ties that representatives of member states have towards different populations 
are significantly different and can thus be discharged simultaneously. To the ex-
tent that this is so, it is hard to see how citizens of any country could legitimately 
expect or demand anything different from their own representatives. Let’s take 
the WTO as an example and for the sake of the argument let’s accept the view 
suggested by Nagel (as it is quite widespread) that this institution is designed 
merely to facilitate bargaining among mutually self-interested parties seeking 
their own advantage.71 On such an understanding, WTO members are not trying 
to collectively agree upon the best trade policies for the global public interest. In-
stead, they are trying to negotiate the best deal for themselves. Now, even in such 
a strategic setting, it is one thing to expect your representatives to advance your 
71 In spite of WTO’s official commitment to the goals of raising the standard of living and of sustainable de-
velopment, many critics maintain that the design of the WTO as a voluntary association to facilitate trade 
among its members makes it simply a marketplace for bargaining in which its members are not trying 
to collectively agree on the best trade policies for everyone, but rather trying to negotiate the best deal 
for themselves. In his book The Bottom Billion, Collier offers a colorful characterization of the WTO along 
these lines: ‘It (the WTO) is not a purposive organization but rather a marketplace. The WTO secretariat is 
there merely to set up the stalls each day, sweep the floor each evening, and regulate the opening hours. 
What happens is determined by the bargaining... The present round of trade negotiations was termed a 
“development round”, but such labels really have no possibility of content in an organization designed for 
bargaining. You might as well label tomorrow’s trading on eBay a “development round”. Trade negotia-
tions are there to get the best deal for their own country, defined in terms of the least opening of the 
home market for the maximum opening of others.’ (pp. 170-71) The legal development of the WTO and its 
internal institutions suggests that this narrow assessment of its functioning is likely to become less and 
less accurate over time, but even if one accepts it as an accurate description of how its members and the 
citizens they represent understand the role of this institution, as I do in the text for the sake of argument, 
it would still seem entirely unjustified to claim that this institution has no obligation to respect human 
rights. It should be noted that, in spite of his cynical assessment of the current design of the WTO, Collier 
does not see any impediment to his ambitious proposal for reform, which involves ‘adding a transfer role 
to its bargaining role’ with the explicit aim of helping the poorest countries at the expense of the stron-
gest economic interests of the richer ones. As he explains, ‘by a transfer I mean an unreciprocrated reduc-
tion in trade barriers against the bottom billion: a gift, not a deal... The secretariat of the WTO should be 
charged with negotiating such a gift as the first phase of each round.’ (p. 171) As a former director of the 
World Bank, Collier takes the Bank’s own development as a model for the WTO: ‘The Bank evolved by add-
ing a transfer role targeted on low-income countries to what was originally a mutual assistance role for 
richer countries. That is what should happen to the WTO.’ (ibid.)
interests and rights as strongly as possible and quite another to expect them to 
advance your interests and rights as strongly as possible at the cost of obviously 
(and foreseeably) violating the basic human rights of others. Since avoiding the 
latter does not require giving equal weight to the interests of all world citizens 
beyond a relevant threshold, an obligation of respecting human rights that is 
shared by all members of a global institution seems perfectly compatible with 
pursuing the strategic aim of advancing the interests of those that one repre-
sents as strongly as possible. To achieve this compatibility all one has to do is stay 
within the (very broad) normative limits established by the prior obligation that 
one shares with all members of the relevant global institution. To the extent that 
this plural view of obligations seems both plausible and normatively compelling, 
it seems that the burden of proof lies on defenders of the state-centric view to 
provide a normative justification for denying that human rights obligations can 
and should be legally entrenched in global institutions even in the absence of a 
world state. 
Now, moving from the normative question of plausibility to the practical question 
of feasibility, there is no denying that the practical difficulties in implementing 
mechanisms that would entrench human rights obligations in global institutions 
are immense. Beyond the usual fear that these mechanisms could be manipu-
lated by the powerful as much as the current ones are, an additional problem is 
that no coherent set of criteria is currently available for evaluating the specific 
impact of global economic regulations on human rights protections. Obviously, 
such criteria won’t be available any time soon unless there is prior agreement 
among members of the international community that they are needed. In any 
event, the development of such a set of specific criteria would be crucial for 
coordinating the work of the different international financial institutions and 
thereby achieving greater coherence in global economic policymaking. Certainly, 
agreement on the specific criteria for assessing basic human rights protections 
by the international community may be hard to achieve and it may also be con-
tested whenever it is perceived as politicized or tainted by an ideological bias. But 
however imperfect, contested and in need of revision such agreements may be, 
implementing them would certainly be an improvement over the alternative of 
leaving the impact of global economic regulations on human rights protections 
entirely out of the equation in the decision-making process of global institutions. 
If the criteria agreed upon are minimal or too narrowly construed establishing 
internal mechanisms of accountability within global institutions that guarantee 
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their obligations to respect human rights are discharged may prevent only the 
most obvious cases of gross human rights violations. But in the absence of any 
such mechanisms there is no reason to expect that even the most obvious viola-
tions will be prevented at all. Even such a modest aspiration seems out of reach 
unless and until there is widespread agreement on the need and the normative 
appropriateness of entrenching human rights obligations in global institutions.
II Applying the spiral model to 
global governance institutions
From a realistic perspective, the most pressing question is whether and to what ex-
tent it is likely that the international community can persuade global governance 
institutions to legally entrench human rights obligations. With this question in 
mind, I would like to briefly turn to an interesting approach that was proposed 
at the start of this decade – an approach that tried to answer the same question 
with regard to the prospects that individual states would increasingly recognize 
human rights norms. In their famous study The Power of Human Rights72, Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink offered the so-called ‘spiral model’ as a theoretical tool to ana-
lyze the impact that human rights norms have on state behavior. The work as 
a whole demonstrated the theoretical fruitfulness of their particular model by 
showing how it could make sense of diverse findings across several case stud-
ies conducted in countries with serious human rights situations, covering all 
major geographical regions of the world. The model specifies a sequence of five 
phases in which governments of states can be situated depending on their of-
ficial attitudes towards human rights norms and some causal mechanisms of 
‘entanglement’ that under favorable circumstances may73 induce them into an 
‘spiral’ whereby it becomes harder and harder to avoid embracing their human 
72 See Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999).
73 As I indicate later, the authors do not interpret the spiral model as suggesting that there is an inevitable 
path that would move an actor from one stage to the next, inevitably leading to the final stage of compli-
ance.
rights obligations. What makes the model interesting is that it does not rely on 
the actors in question possessing normative motivations ‘to do the right thing’, 
especially in the initial stages. To the contrary, the model shows how strategic 
and instrumental motivations of different kinds can nonetheless trigger mecha-
nisms that lead these actors into this spiral of stages, regardless or even in spite of 
their initial motivations to the contrary. In a nutshell, the gist of the model is that 
actors can be led to do the right thing for a variety of wrong reasons. From this 
perspective, the short answer to our question can be conveyed by applying what 
Churchill once said about Americans to the international community as a whole, 
namely, that ‘it can always be counted upon to do the right thing – after all other 
possibilities have been exhausted.’ 
Despite this rather pessimistic or ‘realistic’ feature of the model, it has nonetheless 
been criticized for being too optimistic in that it seems to suggest some inevi-
table path from an initial phase of denying human rights norms all the way to-
wards a final phase of actual compliance. Critics are quick to point out that, while 
it may be true that within the last decade the vast majority of states have in fact 
signed up to most human rights conventions and treaties (as the model suggests), 
the record of compliance is still depressingly low, contrary to what the model 
would lead one to expect. However, the criticism doesn’t really stick. The authors 
repeatedly indicated that their model does not assume an inevitable, evolution-
ary progress and that acceptance of their model therefore does not involve the 
assumption that the spiral will necessarily lead actors to reach the model’s final 
phase of compliance with human rights norms, let alone to do so within any spe-
cific time frame. The model simply identifies some important mechanisms that 
help in explaining the transition from one phase of the model to the next and 
specifies the prevailing logic of action in each of these phases. Thus it explains 
not only progress, but variation and lack of progress as well.
I mention this important point here as a disclaimer that equally applies to my own 
attempt to retool the ‘spiral model’ from its original purpose of analyzing the be-
havior of states to the quite different purpose of analyzing the behavior of non-
state actors such as global governance institutions. In doing so, I do not mean to 
suggest any optimistic prediction about the likelihood that human rights obli-
gations will become legally entrenched within these institutions any time soon. 
I use the ‘spiral model’ in this context because its direct applicability is simply 
striking. The kind of reactions that the spiral model identifies as symptomatic 
of the transition from initial to later stages bears a striking similarity to many of 
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the actual reactions that all three global financial institutions have had with re-
gard to human rights norms. Before I mention some interesting examples, let me 
briefly describe the five stages or phases contained in the ‘spiral model’74. They 
are as follows:
1 Repression and activation of networks: massive violations of human rights by 
a state lead to the activation of some transnational advocacy network that 
gathers information about the violations. Once the norm-violating state is 
put on the international agenda of the network this raises the level of inter-
national public attention.
2 Denial: the initial pressure by the international human rights community 
leads almost invariably to denial. The norm-violating government refuses 
to accept the validity of international human rights norms, it opposes the 
suggestion that its national practices in a given area are subject to interna-
tional jurisdiction and charges that the criticism constitutes an illegitimate 
intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The denial of the validity of 
human rights norms rarely takes the form of open rejection of human rights, 
74 The model relies on three different mechanisms that are operative at different stages: 
 The first type of processes consists in the instrumental adaptation to external pressures. Governments 
adjust their behavior to normative pressures for purely instrumental reasons (e.g. to remain in power) 
and thus without believing in the validity of human rights norms. Examples of that type of adaptation 
are tactical concessions. States may release some prisoners or sign some international agreements, they 
may even start ‘talking the talk’ of human rights in their public activities.
 The second type of processes consists in moral argumentation and persuasion that can lead actors to ac-
cept the validity of norms and to interpret their interests and preferences accordingly. Persuasion is not 
devoid of conflict, it may involve the ‘blaming and shaming’ of the actors in violation of human rights 
norms by international activists. Shaming may persuade governments that aspire to belong to the ‘civi-
lized community of states’ to change their behavior. Governments that start ‘talking the talk’ of human 
rights get entangled in a moral discourse, which may be hard to escape in the long run. The more they 
engage in human rights rhetoric and justify their interests in those terms, the more they get entangled in 
arguments with their opponents (e.g. human rights advocates such as NGOs) and the logic of argumenta-
tive rationality slowly takes over. 
 The third type of processes consists in institutionalization and habitualization. These processes are es-
sential to transition from mere recognition of the validity of human rights norms to actual compliance. 
Once human rights norms are incorporated in the standard operating procedures of domestic institu-
tions, norms get implemented largely independently of the attitudes and beliefs of individual actors. 
Institutionalization and habitualization are necessary to ‘depersonalize’ norm compliance and to insure 
their implementation irrespective of individual beliefs.
but is instead expressed in the form of appeal to an allegedly more valid in-
ternational norm such as national sovereignty.
3 Tactical concessions: if international pressures continue or escalate the norm-
violating state seeks cosmetic changes to pacify international criticism (as 
well as for other strategic reasons such as the desire to remain in power, the 
need for economic aid, etc.). These cosmetic changes (e.g. releasing prisoners 
or greater permissiveness of domestic protest activities) may allow the inter-
nal opposition to gain courage and space and to amplify their demands in the 
international arena. In this phase the norm-violating state no longer denies 
the validity of human rights norms, but typically denies the allegations. By 
doing so it gets entangled in a public controversy with critics who usually 
respond by justifying their accusations. The more states argue with their crit-
ics the more likely they are to make argumentative concessions. At this point 
reputational concerns tend to keep the government in a dialogical mode of 
arguing, so that its own instrumental reasons reinforce the argumentative 
process. This process of ‘self-entrapment’ into argumentative behavior also 
implies that the government begins taking the advocacy networks more seri-
ously and that they have also begun to seriously engage in a dialogue about 
how to improve the human rights situation.
4 Prescriptive status: in this phase the main actors involved regularly refer to 
the human rights norms to describe and comment on their behavior. The 
validity of the norms is no longer controversial, even if the actual behavior 
continues to violate the norms. States ratify the respective international hu-
man rights conventions and treaties, the norms are institutionalized in the 
constitution or domestic law, there is some institutionalized mechanism for 
citizens to complain about human rights violations, etc.
5 Rule-consistent behavior: if pressure ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ continues 
international human rights norms are fully institutionalized, norm compli-
ance becomes a habitual practice of actors and it is enforced by the rule of 
law.
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Now, if one takes the ‘spiral model’ as a guide to understanding the developing at-
titudes of global governance institution such as the WTO, the IMF or the World 
Bank regarding human rights norms, it is not hard to show how, so far, they ap-
pear to have moved along the path from stages one and two to stage three. This 
is quite significant, as stage three immediately precedes the legal recognition of 
human rights obligations. 
As for the first phase, the repression and activation of human rights networks, each 
of these three financial institutions have been the focus of strong public criti-
cism about how their respective policies have negatively impacted human rights. 
There are so many examples of this dynamic that it is impossible to list them all, 
but just to mention some of the best known cases: criticisms of the IMF’s ‘struc-
tural adjustment programs’ imposed on Third World countries (especially dur-
ing the 80’s and 90’s) that notoriously undermined the ability of recipient states 
to protect the most basic human rights of their citizens; criticisms of the World 
Bank’s support for big infrastructural projects that caused the displacement of 
huge populations in total disregard of their most basic human rights (and which 
caused all kinds of ecological disasters); and human rights campaigns against the 
WTO’s policies on intellectual property rights over pharmaceutical products that 
chocked off access to essential medicines from citizens of poor countries, most 
notably access to cheap generic versions of retroviral HIV/AIDS.
With respect to the second phase of denial, each of these institutions has at some 
point or another rejected the validity of human rights norms in precisely the 
same way that the ‘spiral model’ predicts states will reject them. More specifi-
cally, these institutions have not rejected the validity of human rights norms 
themselves, but have instead denied that these norms apply to their activities 
and offered alternative standards and goals that in their view should be used 
for assessing the appropriateness of their actions and policies. This strategy of 
denial typically trades on the ambiguous meaning of the obligation to protect 
human rights that I mentioned before. Taking the obligation in the expansive 
sense of ‘promoting and enforcing’ human rights, these institutions insist that 
such goals are not part of their legal mandate and therefore lie beyond their com-
petence. They insist that the institutions in charge of fulfilling those functions 
are states and non-financial entities such as the United Nations treaty monitor-
ing bodies and regional human rights organizations. An example of this position 
can be found in a letter written by Sergio Pereira Leite, an assistant director of the 
European office of the IMF, with the title ‘The International Monetary Fund and 
Human Rights’, which was published in Le Monde in September of 2001 and can 
be found in the official IMF website.75 He rejects the notion that the promotion 
and enforcement of human rights is part of the IMF mandate, when he states:
‘Since 1999, the IMF has stressed the central role of poverty reduction in the 
Fund’s strategy for low-income countries... It is important to remember, how-
ever, that the ownership of the poverty reduction strategy needs to remain 
with the country. While human rights advocates should be given every op-
portunity to participate in the PRSP (poverty reduction strategy paper) consul-
tations, they should not expect the IMF to impose human rights conditions on 
its assistance to member countries. The IMF simply does not have the expertise 
required to make judgments in this area.... (I)t should be recognized that the IMF 
was created to promote international monetary cooperation and orderly balance 
of payment adjustment.’ (my italics)
As mentioned above, whereas the validity of human rights norms is not denied, the 
applicability of such norms to the activities of the IMF is denied through a variety 
of alternative principles and standards. For example the statement cites other 
valid principles, such as the contention that IMF assistance should not affect the 
sovereignty of states in creating their own policies to protect the rights of their 
citizens, and it also appeals to other valid standards (such as economic coopera-
tion, financial stability, etc.) as the relevant metrics for judging the appropriate-
ness of their activities. However, regarding the much narrower obligation to re-
spect human rights, the IMF can hardly openly defend an interpretation of its 
legal mandate as consisting in the single-minded pursuit of its specific economic 
goals in total disregard of their impact on the most basic human rights of the 
world’s population. In fact, after stating the IMF’s lack of mandate and expertise 
75 The letter can be found at the following address within the IMF website: http://www.imf.org/external/
np/vc/2001/090401.htm. A longer version of the letter was published later in the IMF’s magazine Fi-
nance & Development. This longer version is also available on the IMF website at the following address: 
http://209.133.61.129/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/leite.htm. In the longer version, the titles of the 
sections where each of the passages quoted here are found are even more revealing. They read: ‘What 
is the IMF’s contribution to human rights?’ and ‘Do IMF-supported programs harm economic, social, and 
cultural rights?’ respectively.
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in the area of promoting and enforcing human rights, in the same document we 
find indirect recognition of the obligation to make sure that the IMF’s own poli-
cies do not have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights76:
‘The International Monetary Fund recognizes that it should be aware of any 
adverse side effects of policies it proposes. In those cases, it is often necessary to 
introduce appropriate safety nets to help alleviate adverse social consequenc-
es. This is fully accepted by the IMF... The IMF should endeavor to be open to 
criticism and undertakes to change its policies when results are disappointing.’ 
(my italics)
Obviously, such vague statements fall far short of an explicit recognition of any legal 
human rights obligations, but they suggest that the institution in question has 
entered the third phase of tactical concessions, as described by the spiral model. 
The ‘self-entrapment’ into argumentative behavior through an explicit response 
to public controversy is evidenced by the question to which the passage quoted 
above is supposed to provide an answer, namely, ‘Do IMF-supported programs 
harm economic, social, and cultural rights?’ As the spiral model predicts, once 
an institution gets entangled in publicly addressing such objections, it is likely to 
make argumentative concessions like the one quoted above. In fact, in contradis-
tinction to the WTO, which avoids any reference whatsoever to the term ‘human 
rights’ in any of its public statements, the IMF and the World Bank are already 
clearly ‘talking the talk’ of human rights in many of their statements that have 
been prompted by public criticism about the impact that their activities have on 
the protection of human rights. Although they do not recognize human rights ob-
ligations as part of their legal mandate, in many of their official statements and 
in their web pages they insist that their work ‘promotes’ and ‘contributes to the 
76 The term ‘human rights’ is not explicitly used in the sentence that describes the IMF’s obligations, al-
though when taken in context it is clear that the enjoyment of human rights is the elliptical object of ref-
erence for the ‘adverse side effects’ explicitly mentioned in the sentence. In fact, the official documents 
of all three institutions go to great lengths to avoid the explicit use of the term ‘human rights’ when 
describing their own obligations and responsibilities.
realization’ of human rights.77 Obviously, by making such argumentative conces-
sions, they invite greater public scrutiny of their policies and modes of operation 
as well as open themselves to the risk of being proven wrong by empirical studies 
that may demonstrate their policies actually have negative impacts on human 
rights protections. This, in turn, would force them to make further changes and 
concessions regarding their basic modes of operation.
In fact, the available evidence clearly suggests that all three global financial insti-
tutions currently find themselves in the third phase of making tactical conces-
sions. These concessions are not merely ‘argumentative’ in nature, but include 
actual changes in institutions’s modes of operation in an effort to avoid massive 
public criticism. As described in the passage quoted above, the IMF’s inclusion of 
poverty reduction strategies as an essential component of financial aid is a clear 
step in that direction.78 Similarly, the World Bank’s inclusion of ‘social impact as-
sessments’ was in direct response to the catastrophic consequences of various 
large-scale infrastructural projects that have been financed by the Bank over the 
past few decades. Although the purpose of these assessments is characterized in 
a way that makes no explicit reference to human rights,79 the Bank does explicitly 
say their purpose is to calibrate the social impacts that the Bank’s policies and 
programs have within the recipient countries with respect to their affects on ‘the 
well-being or welfare of different stakeholder groups, with particular focus on 
the poor and vulnerable.’80 As for the WTO, the 2005 amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement regarding patent protections on pharmaceutical products offers 
the clearest example. After extended pressure by well-publicized human rights 
77 For some official statements of the World Bank along these lines see the information on ‘Human Rights’ 
contained in the Frequently Asked Questions section of the Bank’s webpage at http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20749693~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSite
PK:95474,00.html
78 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process was introduced in 1999 as a condition of eligibility 
for debt relief among Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, but has since become ubiquitous in the opera-
tions of the IMF and the World Bank regarding development aid. For an evaluation of its impact on human 
rights so far see the contributions on the topic in Alston and Robinson (2005), 447-508.
79 An interesting exception within the World Bank Group are the ‘Performance Standards’ adopted by the 
IFC which make explicit reference to several UN conventions on human rights. See ‘Performance Stan-
dards and Guidance Notes – 2012 Edition’ at the IFC’s official website http://www.ifc.org/
80 World Bank 2002, at 2.
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campaigns worldwide, in 2005 members of the WTO agreed to amend the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to allow the issuance of compulsory licenses in developed 
countries for the export of essential medicines to poorer countries. Although the 
amendment is an obvious response to the negative impact of pharmaceutical 
patent laws on the human right to health of millions of citizens in poor coun-
tries, the text carefully avoids any use of the term ‘human rights’. Instead of 
using the term ‘right to health’, less committal expressions such as ‘concern for 
public health’ are employed; instead of referring to WTO’s members obligations 
to protect their citizens’ human right to health (or their right to have access to 
essential medicines), less committal expressions are used like in the following 
example: ‘the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO member’s right to protect public health and, in par-
ticular, to promote access to medicines for all.’ (my emphasis). As in the case of the 
IMF quoted above, the amendment’s explicit recognition of the priority of public 
health over intellectual property rights falls short of an official recognition that 
the WTO might have any legal human rights obligations. On the other hand, the 
actual modifications of current patent law (which add some ‘flexibilities’ in its 
application) are not simply argumentative concessions, but are also attempts 
to actually address the negative impact that WTO’s policies have had on human 
rights protections, however insufficient these attempts have been so far. 
Perhaps the closest piece of evidence of an institution moving towards the spiral 
model’s fourth ‘institutionalization’ phase is the World Bank’s establishment of 
the Inspection Panel in 1993. Its mandate is to review complaints from any group 
of private persons alleging that they are suffering or expect to suffer adverse 
material effects from the failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and 
procedures. Although no explicit reference is made to human rights in character-
izing its legal mandate, this Panel is the closest thing one can find to an institu-
tionalized mechanism for individuals to complain about human rights violations 
in a global financial institution. The main normative significance of the Panel’s 
establishment in our context is that it constitutes the first formal acknowledge-
ment that international organizations are accountable not just to their member 
states, but also to individuals or private parties who are affected by their opera-
tions, independently of the relationship that either the organization or the pri-
vate actor has to a member state.81
It is hard to predict whether these timid steps will lead global governance institu-
tions to move to the next stages of the spiral model any time soon. As mentioned 
in the previous lecture, if members of the international community were to take 
the next step of legally entrenching human rights obligations within global in-
stitutions this would be an extraordinary achievement. And, of course, if the 
institutional mechanisms for enforcement were efficient enough to lead these 
institutions to the last stage of actual compliance with human rights norms this 
would be utterly astounding. But, following the realistic spirit of the spiral model, 
perhaps all that one may dare to say at this point is that if the increasing entan-
glement of global institutions with the discourse of human rights can be taken 
as a sign that all other possibilities have already been exhausted, perhaps it is 
not too optimistic to expect that these institutions may do the right thing at last. 
 
 
81 See Bradlow (1994), 554; Woods and Narlikar (2001), 576-77. For additional examples of accountability 
mechanisms adopted by other international institutions in response to the increased demands for ‘good 
governance’ see Reinisch (2005), 50f.
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